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Millennials are losing interest in ownership. They prefer to access property as
needed on a casual, short-term basis. Prompted by the sharing economy, online
platforms, and ethical consumerism, access presents a radical alternative to estab-
lished property forms. This type of property use is popular among younger, tech-
nology-savvy generations. It prioritizes use, flexibility, and mobility over the con-
trol, stability, and attachment that are associated with traditional property forms.
Despite its recent prominence, access has remained surprisingly undertheorized,
especially from a property perspective. This Article fleshes out the normative values
and the concerns ingrained in this emerging property form. In addition, it critical-
ly evaluates the legal and regulatory response to access. It argues that the law con-
tinues to steer users towards ownership or other forms of long-term possession, sig-
nificantly limiting the option of access. Accordingly, it calls for reevaluating
insurance, tax, zoning, and antidiscrimination laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditional property law, with its emphasis on ownership and possession, is
becoming dated.' Access, defined as the casual, short-term use of property, con-
1. Daniel Arthursson, How Millennials Are Defining the Sharing Economy,
ENTREPRENEUR (June 9, 2016), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/275802




tinues to flourish, supported by the sharing economy,' online platforms, and
ethical consumerism.3 Instead of buying a drill, a user might choose to rent
John's drill today and Jill's drill next month. Instead of buying a car, one might
choose to rent Ron's car today and Kate's car next week. The reasons for this
shift include technological advances,4 the economic downturn,' consumer ide-
ology,6 and, no less importantly, generational attitudes. Millennials own less
property than previous generations,' and they prefer flexibility, availability, and
choice over the stability and permanence associated with ownership.8
2. See generally RACHEL BOTSMAN & Roo ROGERS, WHAT'S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE
OF COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010); Rachel Botsman, The Case for Collabo-
rative Consumption (May 2010), http://www.ted.com/talks/rachel botsmanthe-
caseforcollaborative consumption/transcript [http:// perma.cc/H5UM-T8DUJ;
see also BETH BUCZYNSKI, SHARING Is GOOD: How TO SAVE MONEY, TIME AND
RESOURCES THROUGH COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2013); Alice Witt et al.,
Regulating Ride-Sharing in the Peer Economy, 1 COMM. RES. & PRAC. 174 (2015).
Regulation of the sharing economy has been the subject of recent debate. See, e.g.,
Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241 (2015) (discussing
the role of platforms); Sofia Ranchordds, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating
Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413 (2015) (offering
an innovative perspective on legal regulation of the sharing economy); Daniel E.
Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Governmental Law: The Future
of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901 (2015) (discussing
local government regulation of the sharing economy); Sarah B. Schindler, Regulat-
ing the Underground: Secret Supper Clubs, Pop-up Restaurants, and the Role of Law,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 16 (2015); Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO.
L. REv. 501 (2016) (providing a taxonomy of sharing economy projects).
3. See Paolo R. Graziano & Francesca Foreno, Political Consumerism and New Forms
of Political Participation: The Gruppi di Acquisto Solidale in Italy, 644 ANNALS 121
(2012) (discussing political consumerism as a form of democratic participation).
4. See Ann Hynek, How Millennials Are Driving the Sharing Economy, MKT. REALIST
(Mar. 1, 2016), http://marketrealist.com/2016/03/millennials-driving-sharing
-economy/ [http://perma.cc/NW4V-N4RN] (explaining that affinity for technolo-
gy has provided a big boost to the sharing economy).
5. Cf. Mareike Mohlmann, Collaborative Consumption: Determinants of Satisfaction
and the Likelihood of Using a Sharing Economy Option Again, 14 J. CONSUMER
BEHAV. 193 (2015) (finding that cost saving is among the top reasons for reusing a
sharing economy platform).
6. See infra Section II.A.3.
7. Hynek, supra note 4 ("Millennials resonate with the idea of the sharing economy
since it perfectly fits their budgets. Millennials took longer than expected to enter
the job market-and at lower wages. Servicing huge student debt is another issue
straining their already fragile financial situation. No wonder the technology-
driven, asset-light, and low-cost consumption model appeals to millennials. They
shun asset ownership and prefer sharing.").
8. See generally Ruth N. Bolton et al., Understanding Generation Y and Their Use of
Social Media: A Review and Research Agenda, 24 J. SERV. MGMT. 245 (2013); Richey
Piiparinen et al., The Fifth Migration: A Study of Cleveland Millennials 9-10 (Urban
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This Article fleshes out the normative and relational characteristics of ac-
cess as an alternative property form that reflects detachment, flexibility, and an
asset-free lifestyle. It highlights both the values and the concerns ingrained in
this emerging property form. In addition, this Article critically evaluates the le-
gal and regulatory response to access. It argues that, despite the normative
benefits of access, the law continues to steer users towards ownership or other
forms of long-term possession, significantly limiting the option of access.' This
is not an accidental policy. It is supported by legal theory that positions owner-
ship and possession as the conceptual core of property.o
Access allows consumers to bargain for casual short-term use of assets in
lieu of purchasing them. Consumers pay per use of a car, bike, or drill only
when such use is necessary or convenient. Websites such as Turo," Neighbor-
Goods,' Peerbyl3 and many others facilitate casual short-term use of assets by
significantly lowering transaction costs. Access can be practiced independently
or communally. Share is a communal form of access. The asset itself is replacea-
ble, but it is consumed in a cooperative manner. Community lending libraries
of tools, toys, or clothes are good examples. Such projects encourage efficient
forms of consumption and build a sense of community and belonging.14 These
Publications, Paper No. 1338, 2016) (examining trends of mobility in young
adults).
9. Ownership is protected in various legal doctrines. The law protects owners and
long-term possessors from trespass, Avihay Dorfman, The Normativity of the Pri-
vate Ownership Form, 75 MOD. L. REv. 981 (2012), takings, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), and unauthorized search and seizure, U.S. CONsT.
amend. IV. Access requires the development of new legal mechanisms for its pro-
tection, and in particular, the removal of legal barriers to access-based transac-
tions. These barriers include insurance policies, tax law, and antidiscrimination
law. See generally infra Section III.B.
10. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 27-28 (2002) (discussing
ownership as the core of property); A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 2d series 1961) (discussing the importance
and prominence of ownership).
n1. TuRO, http://www.turo.com [http://perma.cc/FCY7-3L3S].
12. MG Siegler, NeighborGoods: Sharing Returns to Its Physical Roots, TECHCRUNCH
(Oct. 7, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2009/10/07/neighborgoods-sharing-returns
-to-its-physical-roots/ [http://perma.cc/BZ94-7Q7G] (discussing a startup that fa-
cilitated sharing goods with your neighbors and friends).
13. PEERBY, http://www.peerby.com [http://perma.cc/6AY7-E6N5].




new forms of property use remain surprisingly undertheorized, especially from
a property perspective."
As this Article explains, access and share contribute to the fulfillment of
freedom," personhood,7 community,'8 and efficiency,'9 which traditionally
have been offered as justifications for the institution of private property.20 Yet
there is an important twist. Instead of freedom from interference, what access
fosters is flexibility and freedom from being tied down to a particular space."
Instead of personhood, access provides the ability to experiment with one's per-
sonality and preferences.' In addition, physical assets are likely to tie people to
a particular community that is most often homogenous.23 Access promotes a
different sense of community. It is a platform of multiple connections and in-
teractions, not only with family, friends, and neighbors, but also with
15. There are relatively few works on property in the sharing economy. See, e.g., Zale,
supra note 2 (offering a taxonomy of property in the sharing economy without en-
gaging with access and share as forms of property).
16. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PROPERTY AS A GUARANTOR OF LIBERTY (1993) (argu-
ing that private property provides freedom to enter and exit exchange relation-
ships); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (1999) (describing the role of pri-
vate property in limiting the power of the state); JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING
OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (2011) (argu-
ing that property shapes social life, with community being a precondition of indi-
vidual freedom); TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, CORNERSTONE OF LIBERTY: PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN 21" CENTURY AMERICA (2006) (describing the connection between property and
individual liberty and criticizing the erosion of freedom in American property).
17. See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982)
(arguing that attachment o property fosters self-development and personhood).
18. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property and Human
Flourishing, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 80 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo
M. Pefialver eds., 2010) (arguing that community is necessary for human flourish-
ing); see also infra Section I.B.
19. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1849 (2007) (arguing that the right to exclude saves information
costs and serves as a moral core of property); see also infra Section I.A.3.
20. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 10 (discussing various justifications for private
property); see also infra Section I.A.
21. See infra Section III.A.2.
22. See infra Section III.A.1.
23. See generally David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating
the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761 (1995) (de-
scribing homogenous communities and exclusion in private neighborhoods); Ed-
uardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009) (describing the
connection between homeownership and communal ties).
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strangers.2 It encourages interactions with others, people who are different
from us, and supports a more flexible and open sense of community.
At the same time, access raises significant normative concerns. Because ac-
cess reflects a casual relation to a thing, it provides less stability and independ-
ence than ownership or possession." In many cases, flexibility is not simply a
preference, but a reality. It follows the lack of stability and security in the job
and housing markets in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis." Users who
choose access are therefore more vulnerable to sudden changes in their lives.
For similar reasons, if users do not own the property, they are less likely to
be responsible users. Moreover, access is mediated by powerful online plat-
forms, compromising privacy and limiting parties' control over the details of
the transaction.27 In addition, access invites commercial activity into a realm
traditionally governed by informal reciprocity and neighborly kindness.' It
risks commodifying relationships. This risk is partially mitigated by the option
of share, because assets are exchanged within the community.29
Access and share are therefore normatively complex, much like ownership
itself.30 Access is so quintessentially different from the way we typically think of
property that it represents an alternative, a choice not to have property (in the
traditional sense).3' However, legal regulation currently makes it difficult for us-
ers to choose access over ownership or long-term possession.32 In typical access
transactions, owners allow short-term use of their car, bike, drill, or ladder to
non-owners in exchange for monetary compensation. The possibility of access
hinges on owners' willingness to participate in these transactions. For example,
insurance policies that deny coverage to owners who rent out their car to casual
users ultimately discourage these owners from making short-term transactions
24. See generally Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy,
43 PEPP. L. REV. 61 (2015) (arguing that the sharing economy creates an interme-
diate space that allows for multiple interactions with friends and strangers).
25. See infra Section III.A.6.
26. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009) (describing the economic risis); Michael
Hout et al., Job Loss and Unemployment, in THE GREAT RECESSION 59 (David B.
Grusky et al. eds., 2011) (describing the effect of the recession on the job market).
27. See infra Section III.B.4 (discussing the role of the platform in facilitating access
and arguing in favor of access without surveillance).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See infra Part I & Section III.B.
31. An inclusive, broad conception of property will include access as a property form.
See infra Section I.B. Yet access represents an alternative to the values associated
with property and its main characteristics, such as stability and attachment. This
Article therefore classifies it as a property form that reflects a choice not to have
property in its traditional sense.




in their personal property, resulting in very limited options for access for non-
owners.33 Another example concerns discrimination in providing goods and
services.34 Public accommodation law prohibits discrimination against protect-
ed classes in places that are open to the public, but it currently does not apply to
owners renting out their own bike, drill, car, or ladder.35 If owners are free to
discriminate, protected classes of non-owners will have few possibilities to ac-
cess, and will be compelled to purchase assets and become owners themselves.
These examples demonstrate how certain legal rules significantly limit the op-
tion of access.
Much like other property uses, access requires state support.36 In order to
ensure a flow of assets, the state has to create the right incentives for owners
who participate in access-based transactions. Although access appears to be
booming, it still operates in the shadow of the law. Moreover, local govern-
ments tend to support access of goods offered by commercial companies and
burden peer-to-peer markets with legal barriers.38 This Article discusses specific
reforms in insurance codes, local regulation, zoning, and public accommoda-
tions laws.39 The nuanced analysis presented in this Article also addresses nor-
mative concerns, including advocating access without surveillance, and points
to a normative balance both between access and share and between access and
ownership. However, the Article mostly brackets third-party effects and nega-
tive externalities. It sets out to uncover an important theoretical and normative
perspective that has escaped the discussion thus far. Once this assertion is ac-
cepted, regulators will need to evaluate other market and community effects.40
33. This problem has prompted important legal reforms in several states. See, e.g.,
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.24 (West 2015) (prohibiting insurers from classifying per-
sonal vehicle sharing as commercial activity).
34. See generally Lisa G. Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to
Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215 (1978) (analyzing developments in public accommo-
dations law); Andrew M. Perlman, Public Accommodation Laws and the Dual Na-
ture of the Freedom ofAssociation, 8 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 111 (1998).
35. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 2017) (explaining that "[n]othing here-
in contained shall be construed to include or to apply to any institution, bona fide
club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private.").
36. The state supports ownership and possession in various ways, including expro-
priation rules, trespass, and search and seizure law. See, e.g., J.W. Harris, PROPERTY
AND JUSTICE 5 (1996); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies
for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454-55, S469 (2002) (ex-
plaining that trespass rules are protecting the core of property, i.e., the right to ex-
clude).
37. See infra Section III.B.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Cf. Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the Sharing Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397 (2016) (of-
fering a regulatory model for the sharing economy); Bryant Cannon & Hanna
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Access and share are central to the study of property.41 They are alternative
property forms that contrast with the familiar focus on stability, independence,
and attachment. It is important to note that the argument is not an attack on
ownership or property sovereignty per se. It acknowledges the significance of
the institution of private property. However, it does challenge ownership's su-
premacy and the legal disregard of other meaningful alternatives. Property
scholarship has yet to consider the role of other models of engagement with
property.42 In addition, access is refers to the use of personal property. It pro-
vides an opportunity to reestablish the long declining scholarly interest in per-
sonal, as opposed to real, property.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I details the modern legal preoccupa-
tion with ownership and long-term possession. It explains the values and theo-
ries that support ownership, discusses notable critiques of it, and clarifies why
current scholarship fails to provide an adequate framework for acknowledging
access and share. Part II deals with changes in consumption patterns in the
twenty-first century. It first surveys key developments in consumption trends,
such as the sharing economy, the rise of intellectual property and intangible as-
sets, and political consumerism; next, it presents the alternatives of access and
share, uncovers their underlying motivations, and reviews their predominant
features. Part III introduces and advances the main argument. It demonstrates
the value of access and share as alternative forms of engaging with property,
working closely with property values, and then calls for significant reforms in
zoning law, insurance codes, local regulation, antidiscrimination laws, and torts
to support access and share as important alternatives to ownership.
Chung, A Framework for Designing Co-Regulation Models Well-Adapted to Tech-
nology-Facilitated Sharing Economies, 31 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 23, 57 (2014) (suggesting a co-regulatory model to address market blind
spots); Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147 (2016) (discussing externalities in the sharing economy and
suggesting guidelines for evaluating regulation).
41. Cf. J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REv. 711
(1996) (critically discussing the in rem and bundle of sticks approaches to proper-
ty).
42. Legal scholarship has discussed forms of common resources, but did not focus on
the choice of individuals to voluntarily create and sustain different types of legal
relations to things. See Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 35 (Kenneth
Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (analyzing various types of common property
regimes); Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968) (dis-
cussing the inefficiencies of the commons); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV.





I. THE HEGEMONY OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION
A. Property as Long-Term Control
The right to private property is deeply entangled with ownership.43 Wheth-
er it is perceived as a bundle of rights" or as a core concept,45 when philoso-
phers and legal scholars defend or criticize the right to private property, they
most often mean ownership.46 At a certain level of generality, ownership repre-
sents the highest protection of the law given to a property interest, and it has
been philosophically and politically linked to freedom, personhood, and self-
development.47 When one looks more closely, at least some of the familiar
property accounts privilege not only ownership, but also long-term, steady pos-
session.45 This Part looks into the structure and reasoning behind the hegemony
of ownership, its justifications, and the important critiques raised by progres-
43. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW (1997) (offering a theory of property
and discussing ownership throughout the book as a paradigmatic example); Mer-
rill & Smith, supra note 19, at 1850 (describing the key feature of property as "the
right of the owner to act as the exclusive gatekeeper of the owned thing"); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant's System of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
795 (2003) (defending a vision of private law as achieving corrective justice with
property and ownership as principle examples).
44. Honord, supra note 10 (describing ownership as including a bundle of rights and
liabilities); see also Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517
(2003) (criticizing the centrality of the bundle of sticks approach to property);
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 742-43, 746-47 (1917) (fragmentizing property and
other rights into rights, privileges, disabilities, and immunities).
45. Avihay Dorfman, Private Ownership, 16 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2010) (arguing that pri-
vate ownership represents an authority relations between owner and non-owner);
Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275
(2008) (arguing that an owner's sovereignty represents the distinguishing element
of property); see also PENNER, supra note 43 (arguing that property is the right to
determine how a thing is used).
46. See WALDRON, supra note 10; Honor6, supra note 10.
47. For freedom, see infra Section I.A.2. For personhood and self-development, see
infra Section I.A.1.
48. See, e.g., supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Dorfman, supra note 45. In
addition, Joseph Singer sees informal property rights as property, and recognizes
non-ownership connections to property, based on long-term attachment. See
JOSEPH W. SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RuLEs, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES xxxvii
(7th ed. 2017) (discussing informal sources of rights, reliance, social customs, and
norms); Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 611
(1988); see also Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, The Informal Property Rights of Boomerang
Children in the Home, 74 MD. L. REv. 127 (2014) (arguing that home sharing cre-
ates a property community among people who live together).
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sive property scholars.49 It focuses on the role of control and continuing posses-
sion as a cornerstone of property law and theory, and confronts the exclusion of
other types of legal relations between a person, a thing, and the rest of the
world. This discussion of justifications and property values will also prove sig-
nificant to the theoretical and normative analysis of access and share as distinct
forms of engaging with property.
1. Property and Personhood
One of the prominent justifications for private property is inspired by He-
gel's concept of the person."o According to this argument, freedom begins with
an abstract being that transcends any contingent traits.' It hinges on the indi-
vidual's capacity for abstraction from any inclination.5 ' This abstract unit then
becomes a developed individual through the process of controlling property. By
engaging in property, a person deals with something external and becomes re-
al.5 3 This control has to be recognized by the community. Other people have to
recognize one's control over property for one to gain approval as a concrete in-
dividual. The property is an external object, by means of which one expresses
her will and recognizes others' will, and through the recognition of others, one
recognizes herself.54 This justification emphasizes control as a critical form of
engaging with property. Only through the power embedded in ownership can
an individual embody her will in external objects.55
Margaret Radin provides a somewhat different perspective on the person-
hood theory. She argues that people need to hold certain possessions. in order to
achieve self-development.5' Radin's work is sensitive to the type of property,
and she distinguishes between fungible assets that do not warrant special pro-
tection and personhood property." For example, the home is closely connected
49. See infra Section I.B. This Section critically analyzes central justifications to private
property. Labor theory is an exception because it is not as relevant to the analysis
of access. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PElALVER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 47 (2012).
50. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 47-77 (T.M. Knox trans., 1967) (1820)
(providing a personhood theory of property).
51. The Hegelian abstract person has no future plans, no goals, and no relationships.
ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN
JURISPRUDENCE 34-38 (1995).
52. WALDRON, supra note 10, at 352-53.
53. Id. at 45.
54. Dudley Knowles, Hegel on Property and Personality, 33 PHIL. Q. 45, 56-57 (1983).
55. WALDRON, supra note 10, at 377-78.
56. Radin, supra note 17.




to personhood, because it is a "scene of one's history and future, one's life and
growth,"'" and therefore warrants special legal protection.
Radin's view is not formalistic. Personhood is not attributable to ownership
per se, but to people's attachment to objects. To illustrate this point, Radin ex-
plains that the occupational rights of tenants should be characterized as per-
sonhood property, while the ownership rights of landlords should be character-
ized as fungible property.9 Her argument highlights the value of continuing
possession as the foundation for personhood.
Whether through ownership or possession, the property as personhood jus-
tification is about controlling assets. It captures the entanglement of the self
with possessions that is projected to the outside world. It connotes stability,
commitment, and attachment manifested through the exclusion of others. In
contrast, access and share are purposefully unstable and reflect detachment,
flexibility, and mobility.
2. Property as Freedom
Scholars often refer to freedom as the foundation of a system of private
property.o Private property creates a zone that is free from the interference of
others." This is in part a spatial argument: property is understood as a physical
place where one can be truly free, an enclave in modern life where living with
other people is the norm.1 More broadly understood, however, the argument
concerns setting boundaries. As Charles Reich explains, "The institution called
property guards the troubled boundary between individual man and the
state.... in a society that chiefly values material well-being, the power to con-
trol a particular portion of that well-being is the very foundation of individuali-
ty.")63
The neo-Kantian philosophy of law provides a different version of property
as noninterference.64 According to Kant, private rights derive from our basic
58. Id. at 992.
59. Id. at 960, 993.
6o. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
61. See D. Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 36 (2009)
(suggesting a strong relationship between property and freedom). But see PURDY,
supra note 16 (defining freedom as a broader, richer value).
62. Barros, supra note 61.
63. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964) (discussing prop-
erty as protecting the individual from the power of the state, and arguing for a new
definition of property).
64. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT'S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
(2009) (presenting a Kantian theory of political theory, and discussing private law
theory); Weinrib, supra note 43; see also Larissa Katz, Ownership and Social Soli-
darity: A Kantian Alternative, 17 LEGAL THEORY 119 (2011) (discussing the princi-
ples of Kantian private law).
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right to independence and the capacity to set and pursue purposes.6 5 Property,
together with other private rights, is about the freedom not to be subject to oth-
er people's choices.' It is therefore an expression of purposiveness in relation to
the purposiveness of others.7 In other words, private property is about exclu-
sion and constraining others as a way of setting purposes."
While Reich is concerned with freedom from the state, Kantians are simi-
larly preoccupied with independence from other people. In contrast, other
scholars are more troubled by the common dependency on private power, and
argue for protection from the private sector.69
Obviously, property rights, and the freedom and control they entail, are far
from absolute.70 Yet according to the traditional Kantian view, the ideal of
property provides a physical or metaphorical safe haven,7 where one can exert
the whimsical, radical, and most individualistic control. For this reason, it is
ownership rather than other forms of possession that allows individuals to con-
trol property to the exclusion of others.
3. Property and Efficiency
Law and economics scholars are typically not in the business of justifying
property on intrinsic grounds?.7 Yet there are significant voices that call for a
65. RIPSTEIN, supra note 64; Katz, supra note 64.
66. This is a narrower vision of autonomy than the one set by Joseph Raz, i.e., being
an author of one's life. See JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 373 (1986).
67. RIPSTEIN, supra note 64, at 93.
68. Id. at 91.
69. As Eduardo Pefialver explains, taking Reich seriously requires protection not only
from state power but from private power as well. Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property,
Power, and Freedom: Reich's "New Property" at Fifty 18, 21-22 (2014) (un-
published manuscript) (available at http://law.loyno.edu/sites/law.loyno.edu/
files/property-power andfreedom_1.pdf [http://perma.ccd9225-6DNA]). Adolf
Berle therefore distinguishes between consumption property, which protects indi-
vidual freedom, and productive property, which represents corporate power and is
a threat to freedom. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY xxiu, xxvm-Xx (rev. ed. 1997); Adolf A.
Berle, Property, Production, and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4 (1965).
70. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 10, at 27. For limitations on exclusion, see HANOCH
DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 48-54 (2011) (detailing a list of insti-
tutions where exclusion is not the determinant of results); see also Nadav Shoked,
The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437 (2014) (describing an affirmative duty of
owners to maintain their property).
71. Cf D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 255
(2006) (discussing the vision of the home as a safe haven); Robert M. Rakoff, Ide-
ology in Everyday Life: The Meaning of the House, 7 POL. & Soc'Y 85 (1977) (de-
scribing the home as a shelter).
72. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.




more conceptual, even a moral, account of property.73 These accounts celebrate
exclusion as the core concept of ownership and property. For example, Thomas
W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith begin by distinguishing property from other ob-
ligations. Contracts only bind the parties to the contract (in personam); proper-
ty binds the rest of the world (in rem).74 They argue that because property is
unique in imposing information costs on third parties, it "requires that the par-
ties adopt one of a limited number of standard forms that define the legal di-
mensions of their relationship."5 They go further to argue, in another article,
that the right to exclude lies at the core of the morality of property? Property
has to rest on a simple and accessible foundation that is intuitively comprehen-
sible, and naturally part of everyday morality." Smith adds another justification
for exclusion. According to the argument, the mediation of a "thing" is a plat-
form for the modular structure of property. Exclusion (as "keeping off' a thing)
protects the use interests of property, resolves use conflicts, and decreases in-
formation costs.78 Others argue that the owner's control and the right to ex-
clude preserve the owner's idiosyncratic values and bargaining position.79
4. Property as Bundle of Sticks
The bundle of sticks approach to the concept of property has been im-
mensely influential in Anglo-American jurisprudence.o Strikingly different
from previous theories, it declares itself to be non-essentialist, looking at the ag-
there is no consistent unified theory for property law); Thomas W. Merrill & Hen-
ry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357
(2001) (criticizing the law and economics view of property as a collection of use
rights in particular resources).
73. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 72; Merrill & Smith, supra note 72.
74. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) (defining proper-
ty as interests that are built on a list of recognized forms) [hereinafter Optimal
Standardization]; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract In-
terface, 101 COLUM. L. REv 773 (2001).
75. Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, supra note 74, at 776.
76. Merrill & Smith, supra note 19.
77. Id. at 1851.
78. Henry E. Smith, The Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARv. L. REv. 1691, 1693
(2012) (suggesting property is the law of things, mediating the modular structure
of property, and giving it its in rem character). This Article concerns a different
take on the "law of things": physical things as platforms for use, enjoyment, and
interactions with others.
79. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 72.
8o. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 1-5 (AM. LAW INST. 1936); Penner, supra
note 41.
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gregated incidents of property instead of searching for its core."' Although most
accounts begin with less emphasis on ownership and more of a critical edge,"
some end up with a hail to exclusion and control as the primary and most im-
portant examples of property. Others, who preserve the realist skepticism, pro-
vide a useful background for the argument.3
Property as a bundle of sticks is a metaphor for the fragmentation of prop-
erty into multiple powers, rights, and liabilities, rather than a unified core.4 The
bundle of sticks metaphor also allows for other forms of property besides own-
ership.15 This type of flexibility has drawn harsh criticism from scholars that
claim it obscures the in rem character of property and leads to ad hoc decision
making.16
Although the bundle of sticks approach fragments the concept of owner-
ship, its application continues to privilege, at least partially, control and exclu-
sion as the highest form of engaging with assets. Take, for example, Anthony
Honord's work on ownership. Honord argues that "the right to possess, viz. to
have exclusive control of a thing or to have such control as the nature of things
admits, is the foundation on which the whole superstructure of ownership
rests."7 This notion of exclusion is not simply one stick in the bundle, but more
profoundly attests to the nature of ownership. A review of the bundle of sticks-
inspired case law supports this conclusion. In a couple of famous regulatory
81. See discussion of the intellectual history of the bundle of sticks in Jane B. Baron,
Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REv. 57
(2014). See also GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING
VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 37-42, 381
(1998).
82. Baron, supra note 81, at 63-65; see also Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting
the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 371, 374 (2003) (referring to the bundle
of sticks metaphor as any bundle of items-say a shopping bag of fruit filled with
oranges, apples, bananas, and peaches-that people are free to pack and rearrange
in whatever way they see fit).
83. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
84. Dagan, supra note 44, at 1532-34 (critically evaluating the bundle of sticks ap-
proach); Hohfeld, supra note 44, at 713-19 (explaining that property rights should
not be understood as rights to things, because juridical relations are always be-
tween persons).
85. Because property is a collection of incidents of rights and liabilities, we can recog-
nize less powerful collections of incidents, such as leases, easements, and some li-
censes. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 23 (1990).
86. See Dagan, supra note 44 (arguing in favor of property institutions as the true real-
ist alternative to the bundle of sticks approach); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & EcON. S77, S82 (2011)
(reconstructing Coase and arguing in favor of property as a baseline rather than as
a bundle of use rights).




taking cases, Dolan v. City of Tigard" and Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion,9 the Supreme Court relied on the bundle of rights approach. In both cas-
es, and others, the Court repeatedly held that the "right to exclude .. . [is] 'one
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly character-
ized as property."'9 o
Nonetheless, the bundle of sticks metaphor is less interested with title, and
more engaged with substance.91 Conceptually, it allows for an infinite number
of property combinations. People and institutions can continuously create new
forms of property uses. Yet, in practice, fragmentation does have its limits. Un-
like contract law, property law recognizes only a limited number of property
forms, most familiar as the numerus clausus principle.92 As Nestor Davidson ex-
plains, the numerus clausus list balances stability and dynamism based on
"competing visions of property's pragmatic function and the aspects of proper-
ty that deserve greater practical recognition in law."93 The bundle of sticks is a
realist approach that understands property as a public institution rather than
simply a private transaction.94
88. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
89. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
go. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (inter-
nal citations omitted); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979).
91. See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV.
1044, 1086 (1984) ("[P]roperty is simply a label for whatever 'bundle of sticks' the
individual has been granted."); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L.
REv. 277, 297 (1998) ("Labeling something as property does not predetermine
what rights an owner does or does not have in it.").
92. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115
YALE L.J. 72 (2005) (discussing the numerus clausus principle in the context of fed-
eralism); Dagan, supra note 44, at 1565-70 (2003) (discussing the numerus clausus
principle in a list of property institutions); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraak-
man, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the
Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373 (2002) (arguing that the numerus clau-
sus principle supports the verification of property rights); Michael A. Heller, The
Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1176-78 (1999) (arguing that
the numerus clausus principle serves as a legal boundary); Daphna Lewinsohn-
Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1669, 1730-39 (2003) (discussing an objective theory of well-being as a jus-
tification for the numerus clausus principle); John Henry Merryman, Policy, Au-
tonomy, and the Numerus Clausus in Italian and American Property Law, 12 AM. J.
COMP. L. 224 (1963); Roderick R.M. Paisley, Real Rights: Practical Problems and
Dogmatic Rigidity, 9 EDINBURGH L. REv. 267, 267 (2004) (discussing the numerus
clausus principle in Scottish law).
93. Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L.
REv. 1597, 1638 (2008).
94. Id. at 1649.
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In contrast, access and share are forms of casual use. They are not directed
towards a specific asset, but rather practice the rapid exchange of goods for use.
Even a flexible approach, such as the bundle of sticks, will still find it difficult to
conceptualize the use of different, constantly changing assets as property.
Moreover, the realist public institution approach requires significant normative
work to explain if and why the law should treat access and share as property.
B. Critiques of Ownership
Alongside theories that focus on control, exclusion, and sovereignty, there
are notable critiques that emphasize the communal and relational aspects of
property,95 the importance of use,96 and other values, such as human flourishing
and community.97 These are important accounts of property that counterbal-
ance the focus on exclusion. Working with these critiques, this Part elucidates
what is still missing in current debates: a conceptual and normative apprecia-
tion of access and share as reflecting a casual relation to a thing.
1. Additional Values
The inclusion of other values into the property paradigm has received a
substantial amount of attention following the Statement of Progressive Property
published in 2009.9 The statement includes a list of values and interests that
95. See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 70, at 37-57; Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The
Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001) (explaining the benefits of cooperation
in property related projects); Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded
Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162 (1991) (arguing against an autonomy-based proper-
ty law on the boundary model); Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, supra
note 48 (arguing that relationships can create property rights); see also Kreiczer-
Levy, supra note 48 (arguing that sharing a home creates informal property rights
in the home).
96. See, e.g., Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 1369 (2011)
(detailing the risks of focusing on exchange value of property without using it);
Pefialver, supra note 23 (explaining the importance of the non-monetary values of
land).
97. See, e.g., Alexander & Pefialver, supra note 18 (presenting an Aristotelian view of
property, and positioning human flourishing as a central value); Gregory S. Alex-
ander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REv.
745, 774 (2009) (presenting an alternative to the dominant property view that
highlights the social obligation norm: "[A]n owner is morally obligated to provide
to the society of which the individual is a member those benefits that the society
reasonably regards as necessary for human flourishing. These are the benefits nec-
essary to the members' development of those human qualities essential to their ca-
pacity to flourish as moral agents and that have some reasonable relationship with
ownership of the affected land.").
98. See generally Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94
CORNELL L. REv. 743 (2009) (stating that property is a pluralist and complex val-




property serves, such as dignity, civic responsibility, human flourishing, physi-
cal security, wealth, happiness, well-being, and a broad definition of autonomy
and freedom.99
These values were developed in prior and subsequent literature. Relational
and communal approaches to property insist that property constructs relation-
ships and does not just set boundaries,'o and that sharing property interests
serves to protect vulnerable parties."o' Neo-Aristotelian scholars argue that
property owners have a responsibility towards their communities as part of a
commitment to human flourishing.0 2 Others emphasize the plurality of values
associated with property, creating distinct forms of property institutions . 0 3
This Article joins progressive approaches in arguing that property is more
than a right to exclude. These approaches contribute to a well-rounded version
of ownership, one that acknowledges obligations and commitment. Nonethe-
less, they all value long-term attachments and neglect the option of a casual,
flexible relation to property.
2. Informal Property Rights
Joseph William Singer stresses the importance of informal sources of
rights.10 4 Rather than focus simply on formal ownership, Singer insists that the
law should incorporate reasonable expectations into its rules because "when in-
formal expectations diverge from formal rules, standards promote certainty while
rules undermine it."'05 This approach departs from the mainstream focus on
ownership, not only in recognizing obligations, but also in its acceptance of new
for property theory that does not focus on exclusion and promotes a pluralist vi-
sion of property values.
99. Id.
1oo. Nedelsky, supra note 95; Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, supra note 48.
101. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, supra note 48.
102. See, e.g., David Lametti, The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects of So-
cial Wealth, 53 U. TORONTO. L.J. 325 (2003); Alexander & Pefialver, supra note 18.
103. See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 70.
104., See generally Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, supra note 48; Joseph Wil-
liam Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1369
(2013).
105. Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, supra note 104, at 1373; see also id. at
1375 ("Standards perform systemic functions that shape the infrastructure and the
outer contours of the property system by: (1) setting minimum standards compati-
ble with the norms of a free and democratic society; (2) protecting the justified ex-
pectations of consumers; and (3) responding to externalities and systemic effects of
the exercise of property rights. Standards also determine the scope of property
rights by: (4) distinguishing cases; (5) resolving conflicting norms; (6) excusing mis-
takes; (7) escaping the 'dead hand' of the past; and (8) deterring the 'bad man'
from abusing property rights.").
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flexible forms of property. The argument of this Article, however, is quite dif-
ferent. Access is a short-term and casual form of use that is not dependent on
previous relationships and attachments. It reflects a detachment and flexibility
and is about not having property in the traditional sense.
3. Open Access and the Commons
The final critique of ownership comes from the research on open access to
resources. Open access concerns resources that can be claimed and used by eve-
ryone, while the commons are jointly owned by a limited and defined group of
people.o' Common ownership and open access are often positioned as alterna-
tives to private property, each with its own benefits and costs."o7
However, both the commons and open access provide very limited alterna-
tives of engaging with property for the individual. Access allows individuals to
constantly change assets, use them casually and move on to the next asset;os
open access is about the use of one common pool of resources. It also typically
includes a certain type of resource that is not easily distributed to private indi-
viduals, such as beaches, open spaces, water, and so on.' 9 In addition, the
commons are quite clearly distinct from access, as they provide stable and long-
term attachments to an asset or resource.11o
There is, however, a certain likeness between the commons and the option
of share, as both involve more communal forms of property structure. Yet this
106. See, e.g., Peter Ekbdck, Private, Common, and Open Access Property Rights in Land -
An Investigation of Economic Principles and Legislation, 6 NORDIC J. SURVEYING &
REAL EST. RES. 57 (2009) (examining the three institutional regimes in Swedish real
property law and their economic implications).
107. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (using institutional analysis to predict the success
of common resources); S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard C. Bishop, "Common
Property" as a Concept in Natural Resources Policy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713
(1975); Dagan & Heller, supra note 95 (arguing in favor of co-ownership and em-
phasizing the benefits of cooperation); Thrdinn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus
Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 73
(Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003); Carol Rose, The Comedy of
the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L.
REv. 711 (1986) (analyzing the success and virtues of public property).
io8. See infra Part III.
109. Rose, supra note 107, at 714 ("Like the older precedents, the new beach cases usu-
ally employ one of three theoretical bases: (1) a 'public trust' theory, to the effect
that the public has always had rights of access to the property in question, and that
any private rights are subordinate to the public's 'trust' rights; (2) a prescriptive or
dedicatory theory, by which a period of public usage gives rise to an implied grant
or gift from private owners; and (3) a theory of 'custom,' where the public asserts
ownership of property under some claim so ancient that it antedates any memory
to the contrary.").




Article focuses on the community lending library as its primary example of
share, which is a unique type of the commons."' The novelty for property law
lies in its separation of communal interaction from attachment to the object.
This type of share is a form of access, but with a communal spin. While owners
are not attached to a particular toy, tool, article of clothing, or book, they are
committed to subsequent users and to the sharing project."2
In sum, the justifications for ownership and its critiques value long-term
involvement with property. They do not respond to changes in consumption
patterns that open up more options for users. The next Part describes new
trends in consumption that call for a new and fuller understanding of property
forms.
II. CONSUMPTION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Engagement with property, with material things and intangible assets, such
as books and music, has dramatically changed in the last few decades."3 Exam-
ples include community gardens, food cooperatives, car sharing, bike sharing,
seed sharing, tool libraries, open-source communities, and many more."4 Alt-
hough some of these supposedly new patterns have existed before,"' considered
ill. See infra Section II.B.2 and Section III.B.2.
112. Id.
113. See Paula Bialski et al., "Saving" the City: Collective Low Budget Organising and Ur-
ban Practice, 15 EPHEMERA 1 (2015) (discussing urban gardening, car sharing,
coworking, food cooperatives, ticket sharing, and waste recycling); David Bollier,
The Commons as a Template for Transformation, GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE 1
(2014), http://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/
downloads/paper-bollier.pdf [http://perma.cc/299K-PJ77] ("A robust transna-
tional movement of commoners now consists of such diverse commons as seed-
sharing cooperatives; communities of open-source software programmers; locali-
ties that use alternative currencies to invigorate their economies; subsistence
commons based on forests, fisheries, arable land, and wild game; and local food
initiatives such as community-supported agriculture, Slow Food, and permacul-
ture.").
114. See Bialski et al., supra note 113; Bollier, supra note 113.
115. Sharing has existed before. People rented rooms in their homes to roomers and
shared rides and food. See, e.g., Jun-E Tan, The Leap of Faith from Online to Of-
fline: An Exploratory Study of Couchsurfing.org, in TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHY
COMPUTING 367, 371 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2010) (comparing
couchsurfing to previous hospitality exchanges: "Hospitality exchange networks
are not a new phenomenon-the oldest such network is Servas International,
founded in 1949 by an American named Bob Luitweiler. With the tagline 'With
every true friendship we build the basis for World Peace', Servas International set a
common theme also used by newer hospitality exchange networks, to promote in-
tercultural understanding and to reduce intolerance among people of different
cultural backgrounds. Other networks include Hospitality Club (founded in 2000,
with about 330,000 members); GlobalFreeloaders.com (founded in 2005, with
about 60,000 members). Hospitality exchange is grounded on reciprocity, negoti-
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together, these phenomena merit a new take on property. These patterns of use
did not just emerge, but rather are embedded in larger processes, including the
need to save resources in a time of financial instability and rapid technological
advances."'
This Part will begin by surveying the major important patterns-the shar-
ing economy, intellectual property, and political consumerism-and depict the
decline of ownership as the most coveted form of consumption. It will continue
by introducing the structure, motivations, and legal background of access and
share as artifacts of these changing winds of consumption.
A. New Modalities of Consumption
1. The Sharing Economy
The sharing economy is a modern form of consumption based on collabo-
ration in the use, production, or creation of products and services."7 Collabora-
tive consumption has been simplified and redefined by technological advances,
online communication, and improved reputation mechanisms; people are now
able to share, barter, lend, rent, swap, and gift their property online."' The phe-
nomenon has become so pervasive that it has attracted a huge amount of atten-
tion from the media, social networks, and public discourse.19 For example,
Time Magazine named the sharing economy among its "10 Ideas that Will
Change the World."'2 0 The sharing economy is also gradually gaining significant
financial momentum.2' According to PwC, five sharing economy sectors alone
could generate $335 billion in revenues by 2025.122 In addition, Forbes estimated
the revenue flowing through the sharing economy in 2013 at $3.5 billion. 2 3
ating thin lines between 'guest' and 'parasite', hospitality and home." (internal ci-
tations omitted)).
116. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
117. See BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 2.
118. Id. at xv (organizing collaborative consumption projects into three categories:
product service systems, redistribution markets, and collaborative lifestyle).
119. On the sharing economy, see sources cited supra note 2.
120. Bryan Walsh,- Today's Smart Choice: Don't Own. Share, TIME (Mar. 17, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2059521_2059717,
00.html [http://perma.cc/W37V-M7JW].
121. Val Skelton, The Sharing Economy - How Much is it Worth?, INFO. TODAY EUR.
(May 4, 2015), http://www.infotoday.eu/Articles/News/InfoToday-Europe
-Blog/the-sharing-economy-how-much-is-it-worth-103690.aspx [http://perma.cc/
EC4E-UNTL].
122. Laura French, Sharing Economy Shakes up Traditional Business Models, NEW
ECONOMY (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.theneweconomy.com/business/the
-sharing-economy-shakes-up-traditional-business-models [http://perma.cc/
V2RV-DDDL];. Tilly Parke, Europe's Five Key Sharing Economy Sectors Could De-




The sharing economy is an umbrella term that consists of a wide range of
transactions. First, the sharing economy allows people to make better use of
their own property.' The sharing economy allows owners to rent out assets
such as a car, their home,"' a bicycle, or even pets to strangers, using new forms
of peer-to-peer markets." Sites like RelayRide.com, Getaround.com or Just-
ShareIt.com facilitate renting out your car and sites like Neighborgoods.net and
Peerby.com allow people to rent out or share everyday possessions.
The incentives of owners complement those of users. Users prefer to access
assets on a casual basis instead of purchasing unnecessary objects. Owning an
item has a higher cost for consumers,'7 does not allow for flexibility of use,'
releases/europe-s-five-key-sharing-economy-sectors-could-deliver--57-billion-by
-2025/s/45858e92-ela7-4466-a011-a7f6b9bb488f [http://perma.cc/ K8YP-52H9].
123. Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES (Jan.
13, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-
unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/ [http://perma.cc/26B8-5DSW].
124. Cf Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Shar-
ing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004) (discussing the
idle capacity of lumpy, mid-level assets).
125. See Georgios Zervas, Davide Proserpio & John W. Byers, The Rise of the Sharing
Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry, 54 J. MARKETING
RES. 687 (analyzing Airbnb in Texas and its economic impact on the hotel indus-
try).
126. Peer-to-peer markets are markets where trade occurs between peers. See, e.g.,
Anindya Ghose et al., Reputation Premiums in Electronic Peer-to-Peer Markets: An-
alyzing Textual Feedback and Network Structure, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD
WORKSHOP ON ECONOMICS OF PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEMS 150-54 (2005).
127. See generally Cait Poynor Lamberton & Randall L. Rose, When Is Ours Better Than
Mine? A Framework for Understanding and Altering Participation in Commercial
Sharing Systems, 76 J. MARKETING 109 (2012) (surveying the relevant benefits of
sharing transactions as opposed to the model of ownership).
128. Id. at 111. At the same time, there are also costs associated with sharing, in par-
ticular the price of a shared product, the cost of learning to use unfamiliar prod-
ucts repeatedly, and the cost of searching for new products. These include:
[O]ne-time system membership fee[s] or periodic access fees. We refer to this as
the "price of sharing." Second, "technical costs" refer to nonmonetary costs asso-
ciated with coping with and learning how to use unfamiliar products. With pur-
chased products, this is usually a one-time cost. However, with shared products,
this cost may be incurred multiple times. For example, in an automobile-sharing
system, customers may need to operate unfamiliar vehicles repeatedly as they ac-
cess different types of vehicles. Third, "search costs" are created through the mon-
ey or effort needed to determine which product to purchase or which sharing pro-
gram to enter. In sharing programs, additional search costs may also be incurred
after entry, as customers need to identify and access the appropriate version of the
shared product for them.
Id.
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and carries storage and maintenance costs.'9 In addition, as will be discussed at
length in the next section, certain consumers opt for a more sustainable alterna-
tive because of their concern for the environment.130
Second, the sharing economy also includes citywide cooperative projects
such as bike sharing and car sharing.131 These projects are considered a "cheap,
efficient, and healthy means of navigating dense urban environments."132 Users
consist of commuters, utility users who use bikes for shopping and errands, lei-
sure users who bicycle for fun and exercise, and tourists.'
A third type of sharing economy transactions includes lending, bartering,
and swapping.134 People may swap books or CDs using a barter system.' Peers
exchange goods, and the recipients gain and retain ownership of the newly re-
ceived item. A fourth example concerns cooperative endeavors. Sharing projects
are neighborhood-based and designed to foster trust and cooperation. They in-
clude, for example, tool libraries that are "neighborhood hubs offering classes,
community building spaces, workshops, and a variety of tools ranging from belt
sanders to lawnmowers and more."' " Another example is seed libraries that al-
low farmers and gardeners to borrow and share seed varieties.37
Fifth, traditional businesses have capitalized on the sharing economy trend
and many are now offering services that are based on use and access rather than
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. There have been several attempts at bike sharing since the 1960s, but most have
proven unsuccessful in the long run, until the new "third generation" of bike shar-
ing. See generally Paul DeMaio, Bike-Sharing. History, Impacts, Models of Provision,
and Future, 12 J. PUB. TRANS. 41 (2009).
132. Oliver O'Brien et al., Mining Bicycle Sharing Data for Generating Insights into Sus-
tainable Transport Systems, 34 J. TRANS. GEOGRAPHY 262, 262 (2014).
133. Id.
134. See generally Juho Hamari et al., The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in
Collaborative Consumption, 67 J. Ass'N INFO. SCI. & TECH. 2047, 2055 (2016). Ex-
amples of swapping sites include Swap.com, Swapstyle.com, and ReSecond.com,
which allow users to swap unwanted clothes and cosmetics. Other sites, such as
BookMooch.com or TitleTrader.com, facilitate the lending and swapping of books
and CDs.
135. See, e.g., SWAPTREE, http://web.archive.org/web/20100627090819/
http://www.swaptree.com [http://perma.cc/R6X2-Y6KU].
136. Cat Johnson, The Tool Library Movement Gains Steam, SHAREABLE (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.shareable.net/blog/the-tool-library-movement-gains-steam
[http://perma.cc/CKH3-8BED].






ownership and possession.'^8 This is particularly common in the car-sharing
business. Automobile manufacturers are buying or starting car-sharing enter-
prises such as Zipcar (Avis) and Car2Go (Benz).139 The reason for this strategy is
that young people are gradually losing their interest in car ownership.140 Own-
ing, maintaining, and parking a car can be expensive and not worth the trouble.
Moreover, the flight from the suburbs to the city brings with it new transporta-
tion needs.4 '
This review canvasses in very broad strokes the sheer variety of the sharing
economy phenomenon. The sharing economy carries both promise and risk.'42
Nonetheless, it is clear that the sharing economy as a whole shifts the focus
from ownership to other forms of consumption.
2. Consumption of Intangible Assets
The consumption of intangible assets, commonly understood as intellectual
property-books, art, music, science, and software-is a field dominated by in-
novation, where forms of engaging with these assets are continuously evolv-
ing.143 Although many assets are protected by copyright law, and thus fit nicely
with the ownership and exclusion model, there are also significant movements
that offer sophisticated forms of access and collaboration.144
138. See generally Russell Belk, You Are What You Can Access: Sharing and Collaborative
Consumption Online, 67 J. Bus. RES. 1595 (2014) (comparing sharing and collabo-
rative consumption with a focus on commercial companies uch as Zipcar). Cf
Russell Belk, Sharing Versus Pseudo Sharing in Web 2.0, 18 ANTHROPOLOGIST 7
(2014) (criticizing the use of the sharing vocabulary for commercial sharing).
139. Belk, You Are What You Can Access, supra note 138, at 1597; see also Jorg Firnkorn
& Martin Mtiller, Selling Mobility Instead of Cars: New Business Strategies of Au-
tomakers and the Impact on Private Vehicle Holding, 21 Bus. STRATEGY & ENv'T 264
(2012) (indicating that the number of private vehicles are reduced due to consum-
er preferences). Firnkorn & Miller explain that:
[A]utomakers increasingly face external pressures from governmental institutions,
e.g. regulations on end-of-life vehicles and C02 emissions. Also, the consumer
perception of the 'object car' is changing; e.g., a study in Germany found a tenden-
cy for the value of cars as a 'status symbol' to be diminishing within the 18-25
years age group.
Id. at 266.
140. Belk, You Are What You Can Access, supra note 138, at 1597-98.
141. Id. at 1598.
142. See generally Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 24 (arguing for a new framework for prop-
erty in the sharing economy with its promises and concerns).
143. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO L.J. 287 (1988)
(reviewing justifications for intellectual property).
144. See, e.g., Miriam Bitton, Modernizing Copyright Law, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 65
(2011) (arguing in favor of a new, modernized regime for copyright law); Niva
Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facili-
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These movements are determined to provide open access to innovation,
knowledge, and expression.1 45 There are different models at work, but they all
allow users to enjoy an access-based engagement with the asset without pur-
chasing either a copy or a license for long-term use. These movements include
the Creative Commons project,146 the free software movement,47 collective cre-
ations,'48 and digital libraries.49 For millennials, the distinctions between crea-
tating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REv 375 (2005) (expressing a skeptical
view towards Creative Commons' legal strategy); Lawrence Lessig, The Creative
Commons, 65 MONT. L. REv. 1 (2004) (describing the Creative Commons project).
145. The term "access movements" is borrowed from Jessica Silbey, who argues that
access movements are:
[A] response to the expansion of intellectual-property rights (building fences stat-
utorily or on a case-by-case basis) and a growing digital culture that disseminates
information and expression broadly and quickly (breaking down fences). In a
networked world where information and expression are only a click away, most
users of the Internet recognize how much knowledge and culture (in the form of
patented inventions, trademarks, or copyrighted works) are not free to use.
Jessica Silbey, Comparative Tales of Origins and Access: Intellectual Property and the
Rhetoric of Social Change, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 195, 197 (2010).
146. Creative Commons is a nonprofit organization that operates a licensing system
which allows creators of written, audio, and video content to facilitate sharing of
their copyrighted works. It thus promotes the easy and free use of these works. See
Elkin-Koren, supra note 144; Zachary Katz, Pitfalls of Open Licensing: An Analysis
of Creative Commons Licensing, 46 IDEA 391 (2006). This system replaces the fa-
miliar "all rights reserved" maxim of copyright law with "some rights reserved,"
supporting an array of flexible license types. See Silbey, supra note 145, at 206 (ex-
plaining that "[t]hese Access Movement voices contend that practical accessibil-
ity-which might include affordable or free use of otherwise-exclusive rights in intel-
lectual property-is now necessary to promote progress and the useful arts for all,
as much as it may also be a matter of dignity and survival for some.").
147. The free software movement employs a general public license. See GNU General
Public License, GNU (June 29, 2007), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html
[http://perma.cc/S4PD-SXNRI; see also Silbey, supra note 145; Mira T. Sundara
Rajan, Creative Commons: America's Moral Rights?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 905 (2011). The license "is intended to guarantee your freedom
to share and change all versions of a program-to make sure it remains free soft-
ware for all its users." GNU General Public License, supra.
148. Collective creations, of which the most famous example is probably Wikipedia,
create knowledge built on the participation of the general public that introduces
new topics and modifies existing entries. See Sundara Rajan, supra note 147, at
946. Wikipedia operates under a free content license and allows general public ac-
cess. See WIKIPEDIA, Wikipedia: Ten Things You May Not Know about Wikipedia
(Sept. 12, 2017), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Tenjthings
you-maynot knowaboutWikipedia [http://perma.cc/C7T5-L6A3]. While
consumers used to purchase encyclopedias, they can now use specific data and
knowledge when needed on a more casual basis. In addition, a consumer can be-




tor, owner, and consumer are blurring, and in the digital world, the assumption
is that information and creations are everyone's property."?
Consumption of intellectual property goods has shifted in recent decades
from the purchase of personal property (books, CDs) to use-right licenses that
minimize the user's control. Ownership is no longer relevant in the area of in-
tellectual property.
This type of access is importantly different from a recently significant con-
cern surrounding intellectual property licensing and the first sale doctrine."5 '
Consumption of intellectual property has shifted in recent decades from the
purchase of personal property, such as books and CDs, to use-right licenses.'
Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz critically evaluate this process and argue
for the benefits of personal property because it provides stability and perma-
nence."3 But Perzanowski and Schultz do not evaluate ownership against the
benefits of short-term access. Licenses are actually a mode of long-term en-
gagement with ownership.'5 However, their critique does point to an important
concern: the power of big platforms in constructing elaborate licenses and lim-
iting consumer's control. Part III will return to this concern.
3. Political Consumerism
Political consumerism is a form of political expression through consumer
decisions.' Typically, this form of expression is linked to the choice of purchas-
149. Digital libraries, such as the Digital Public Library of America, allow full or limited
text view of books and other resources and make those available to the general
public. See DIGITAL PUBLIC LIBRARY OF AMERICA, http://dp.la/info/
[http://perma.cc/A7BG-SMQ2] (last visited Oct. 5, 2017); see also Abdulmumin
Isah et al., Analyzing Digital Library Initiatives: 5S Theory Perspective, 21 NEW REV.
ACAD. LIBRARIANSHIP 68 (2015). Digital libraries facilitate the search and con-
sumption of information and art without necessarily purchasing it.
150. Diana Oblinger, Boomers, Gen-Xers, and Millennials: Understanding the New Stu-
dents, EDUCAUSE REv. 37, 41 (2003), http://www.educause.edu/ir/
library/pdf/erm0342.pdf [http://perma.cc/T4TS-KQUZ].
151. See, e.g., AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP (2016)
(explaining the problems of purchasing digital goods through licenses); Ariel Katz,
The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale Restraints, 2014 BYU L. REV.
55 (2014) (discussing the ability of intellectual property owners to opt out of the
first sale doctrine).
152. PERZANOWSKI & SCHULTZ, supra note 151.
153. Id.; see also Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Legislating Digital Exhaustion,
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1535 (2015); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconcil-
ing Intellectual Property & Personal Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1211 (2015).
154. Perzanowski & Schultz, Legislating Digital Exhaustion, supra note 153, at 1537-38.
155. See Dietlind Stolle et al., Politics in the Supermarket: Political Consumerism as a
Form of Political Participation, 26 INT'L POL. Sci. REv. 245 (2005); Meredith Ann
Katz, The Politics of Purchasing: Ethical Consumerism, Civic Engagement, and
Political Participation in the United States (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
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ing through boycotting (punishing businesses for unfavorable behavior) or
"buycotting" (rewarding businesses for favorable behavior)."' Millennials are
generally considered to be more inclined towards ethical consumerism, com-
pared with previous generations.17 Several scholars have associated more col-
laborative forms of consumption with political or ethical consumerism."' Alt-
hough the findings are not conclusive,159 one motivation for engaging in sharing
economy transactions is to advocate for environmentalism and sustainability
and to protest overconsumption."So
4. Summary: Consumption and the Decline of Ownership
For many years, ownership has been conceptualized as the "ultimate ex-
pression of consumer desire."'"' Indeed, ownership of possessions has been con-
sidered part of consumers' identities and their extended self.'62 Recently, how-
Virginia Polytechnic Institute) (available online at http://scholar.1ib.vt.edu/
theses/available/etd- 11182011-192655/unrestricted/Katz_MA_D_2011 .pdf
[hftp://perma.cc/8KNR-Z58N]).
156. Lisa A. Neilson, Boycott or Buycott? Understanding Political Consumerism, 9 J.
CONSUMER BEHAV. 214 (2010); see also Melissa R. Gotlieb & Chris Wells, From
Concerned Shopper to Dutiful Citizen: Implications of Individual and Collective Ori-
entations toward Political Consumerism, 644 ANNALS 207 (2012) (describing politi-
cal consumerism as a form of expressive politics); Stolle et al., supra note 155, at
246 (distinguishing between boycotters and buycotters).
157. Tania Bucic et al., Ethical Consumers Among the Millennials: A Cross-National
Study, 110 J. BuS. ETHICS 113, 113 (2012) ("[E]thical consumerism refers to choic-
es based on social, nontraditional components of products and personal and mor-
al beliefs.").
158. See, e.g., Lucie K. Ozanne & Paul W. Ballantine, Sharing as a Form of Anti-
Consumption? An Examination of Toy Library Users, 9 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 485
(2010) (describing the benefits of toy libraries for users, including anti-
consumption motivations and market avoidance); Cornelia Grimshorn & Marlene
Jordan, Ownership - A Challenged Consumer Ideal (2015) (unpublished M.Sc.
thesis, Lund University) (available online at http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/
download?func=downloadFile&recordOld=5468892&fileOld=5468905 [http://
perma.cc/T55E-Q3NY]) (describing ethical consumerism as a motivation for
clothing libraries); Katz, supra note 155, at 64.
159. See Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, Access-Based Consumption: The Case of
Car Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 881, 890 (2012) (finding no political consumer-
ism in consumers' choice to use Zipcar).
16o. See Rudy Baum, The Story of Stuff, 87 CHEM. & ENG. NEws 3 (2009); Grimshorn &
Jordan, supra note 158 (finding that in clothing libraries and clothes swapping
there is an expression of political consumerism and, in particular, support for a
greener way to consume).
161. Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 159, at 881.
162. Russell Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 139 (1988); cf.




ever, the new patterns of consumption discussed in this Part have begun to
challenge this truism. The rise of intellectual property and collaborative con-
sumption has led to a decline in the symbolic significance of ownership.' Al-
ternative forms of consumption, in particular access-based consumption6 4 are
becoming a recognizable option with their own unique characteristics. In par-
ticular, access-based consumption allows flexibility and adaptability,s and cre-
ates a different relationship with possession that is termed "liquid."'66
Nonetheless, the development is not entirely revolutionary, as ownership
has yet to lose its centrality in consumers' lives. A recent study found that con-
sumers who enthusiastically participate in the sharing economy still prefer
ownership in four main asset categories: intimate possessions for hygienic rea-
sons, frequently used objects such as a, television, objects with emotional at-
tachment, and the home.'' What we are witnessing is not a paradigm change
that overthrows ownership, but the emergence of a more nuanced set of con-
sumer choices that includes diverse forms of attachment to or detachment from
assets.'
("Nevertheless, it is evident that the current wave of digital technologies is funda-
mentally changing consumer behavior in ways that have significant implications
for the formulation of the extended self.").
163. See Belk, You Are What You Can Access, supra note 138; BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra
note 2, at 91; cf. Yu Chen, Possession and Access: Consumer Desires and Value Per-
ceptions Regarding Contemporary Art Collection and Exhibit Visits, 35 J. CONSUMER
RES. 925 (2009).
164. Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 159 (describing access in car sharing platforms).
165. Id. at 883.
166. See Fleura Bardhi et al., Liquid Relationship to Possessions, 39 J. CONSUMER RES.
510, 511 (2012) ("We identify and develop the construct of a liquid relationship to
possessions to characterize the detached and flexible way consumers relate to ob-
jects in contemporary global nomadism. We show that relationships to posses-
sions are temporary and situational; possessions are appreciated for their instru-
mental use-value and their immateriality.").
167. Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 158.
168. Id. This use of consumption patterns to challenge legal property theory is a bit un-
orthodox. The intersection of property and consumption has rarely been studied,
as consumption is probably understood as one gate through which a person.be-
comes an owner. The path itself is not significant, while the legal relation is. But
we are beginning to see that as consumption patterns change, so too do the legal
relations between users (owners, possessors, and "accessors"), things, and the rest
of the world. Property theory does not need to delve deeply into consumer behav-
ior to realize this simple truth. This Article seeks instead to examine the breadth of
legal options and relations. This can be done by assuming the consumer's perspec-
tive, the user's choice, if indeed the law gives credence to the possible methods of
engaging with property. In other words, this Article focuses on the way people use
and enjoy assets and explains its legal significance.
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B. New Alternatives
This section explains in depth the new alternative modes of engaging with
property-access and share-and discusses the motivations for such activities,
the relevant legal framework, and potential difficulties.
1. Access
Instead of buying new things, a person can choose to use a particular item
only when needed.16 9 You do not have to own a car; instead, you can simply
rent one from owners via online platforms such as Turo, Getaround, or Just-
Sharelt, or casually rent a car from a company such as ZipCar or Car2Go. Peo-
ple can also casually use assets such as bikes, drills, ladders, lawn mowers,
books, basketballs, and many other items via platforms such as NeighborGoods,
Peerby, and RentyThing. If you love dogs, but are afraid of the long-term com-
mitment, you can also casually spend time with a dog by connecting with dog
owners via the site BorrowMyDoggy. According to one study, more than 110
million North Americans use at least one of the sharing economy projects."'
Peer-to-peer markets are expanding rapidly in many ways, including the num-
ber of users, areas of trade, and geography.' Millennials in particular are en-
thusiastic participants in the sharing economy and are inclined to favor access
over ownership.1 2
Because this Article defines access as short-term casual use, it distinctively
leaves out other affiliated types of transactions. It brackets swapping and barter-
ing, because users still retain ownership of the swapped goods.'73 Similarly, this
Article does not consider access to services. For example, ride-sharing platforms
such as Uber and Lyft offer rides by the owner of the car that drives users to
169. Tobias Schaefers et al., How the Burdens of Ownership Promote Consumer Usage of
Access-Based Services, 27 MARKETING LETTERS 569 (2016) (describing access as an
alternative to ownership and its benefits in avoiding the risks and responsibilities
associated with ownership).
170. Jeremiah Owyang, Infographics: Growth of Sharing in the Collaborative Economy,
WEB STRATEGIST BLOG (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.web-strategist
.com/blog/2015/11/19/growth-of-sharing-in-the-collaborative-economy-top
-categories-and-forecasts-infographics [http://perma.cc/2ENY-JUVF].
171. Jeremiah Owyang, Infographic: A Day in the Life of the Collaborative Economy, WEB
STRATEGIST BLOG (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.web-strategist
.com/blog/2014/09/29/a-day-in-the-life-of [http://perma.cc/LZA6-Z9YN].
172. Hynek, supra note 4.
173. See, e.g., GETSWISHING, http://www.getswishing.com [http://perma.cc/JLV5





their desired location. These projects involve more than access to property, in
particular labor and workers' rights,"1 4 and merit a separate discussion.
In addition, access to property as a way to capitalize wealth, such as short-
term possession of stocks and bonds, is also a distinctively different form of
property relation. First, stocks and bonds emphasize market value instead of ac-
tual use, or, in other words, exchange value as opposed to use value."' Second,
these practices are not designed to replace ownership of a particular item.
Furthermore, access is also distinguishable from leasing and renting. Long-
term possession provides the stability associated with ownership, and is still
very much within the boundaries of the traditional property paradigm. This Ar-
ticle focuses on short-term use. Nonetheless, short-term rentals were common
even before the sharing economy. Business models based on access are not
new."' Rather, they are gaining momentum and have become more prevalent.
Moreover, the short-term market is much more dispersed. Peer-to-peer mar-
kets connect small suppliers and consumers. Technological advances have low-
ered transaction costs, allowing individuals with no business experience or ex-
pertise to utilize the excess capacity of their property. The causes for this shift
are complex, and implicate the lack of stability for either involuntary reasons,
such as the economic crisis, or voluntary reasons, such as generational prefer-
ences. Yet, as flexible forms of use become prevalent, the law has to consider
their normative status. Although this Article addresses users and their con-
sumption choices, these choices are influenced by the available options in peer-
to-peer markets. As the next Part explains, protecting peer-to-peer markets is a
crucial step in recognizing access as an alternative to property.
Although business companies are significantly different than peer-to-peer
markets, this Part does include commercially based access. ZipCar and Turo
174. See Catherine Lee Rassman, Regulating Rideshare Without Stifling Innovation: Ex-
amining the Drivers, the Insurance "Gap," and Why Pennsylvania Should Get on
Board, 15 Prrr. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 81 (2014) (examining ride sharing regulation in
Pennsylvania and focusing on labor and insurance regulation); Janelle Orsi, The
Sharing Economy Just Got Real, SHAREABLE (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://www.shareable.net/blog/the-sharing-economy-just-got-real [http://perma
.cc/ZQP8-U9GB].
175. See Karl Marx, The Grundrisse, in THE MARX ENGELS READER 221, 256-57 (Robert
C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978); Dyal-Chand, supra note 96, at 1375-76 (arguing that
premature exchange negatively affected the usefulness of the property); Pefialver,
supra note 23; see also Lee Ann Fennel, Homeownership 2.0, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
1047 (2008) (discussing homeownership as consumption and investment); cf.
Dorfman, supra note 9, at 983 (" [W] hile the owner holds the (arguably) legitimate
right to use her object, to the exclusion of others, she can also exclude simply for
the sake of excluding others with no necessary reference to use, even potential use,
at all.").
176. Home Depot, for example, began renting tools in stores in the 1990. Renting Tools
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both provide creative ways to save on transportation costs. ZipCar offers car-
sharing of cars owned by a commercial company. Turo is a peer-to-peer market
that allows private owners to rent out their cars. Although the argument con-
siders both types of access, there are important differences between them that
will prove important for advancing legal reform. Rental companies usually tend
to encourage a brand community and identification with specific cars.'" In this
sense, commercial companies attempt to construct a less casual relation to
things and favor a steady business relation with the company. This type of ac-
cess is somewhat similar to Jeremey Rifkin's projection regarding The Age ofAc-
cess in his influential book.17
Rifkin claims that in the new economy, ownership of goods becomes out-
dated as "markets are making ways for networks and ownership is steadily being
replaced by access."179 Instead of buyers and sellers, there are servers and clients
who bargain for access through lease, rent, subscriptions, or memberships."'
Yet Rifkin emphasizes a business strategy that uses access as a form of long-term
attachment of consumers to companies. When a dealer sells a car to a buyer,
their relationship is limited and short-term. When the consumer gains access in
the form of a lease, the relationship becomes ongoing, renewable, and potential-
ly perpetual."' It becomes what Rifkin terms "a commodifying relationship.""'
Rifkin therefore seems to be discussing a form of access that is essentially a form
of long-term engagement with assets and brands, but lacks a formal ownership
component and the consumer's control.
The form of access that is the subject of this study is significantly different.
It concerns individuals engaging in an alternative type of relation with respect
to a thing and to other people. Access connotes flexibility, mobility, and choice.
Rather than the flexibility associated with managing an asset that comes with
ownership (that is, the ability to use the property whenever the owner desires),
access facilitates flexibility associated with mobility and commitment-free
choice.
The motivations for choosing access over ownership are twofold. The first
type of incentive is economic. Access saves time and money, increases flexibil-
ity, and eliminates the costs of storage.183 On the other hand, there are also costs
177. See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 159, at 888 ("[I]n efforts to encourage personal-
ization of the cars, Zipcar engages users in online forums, such as Facebook, in
competitions to name its cars and uses the human names given to the cars in the
booking form for the users .... ).
178. See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS: THE NEW CuLTuRE OF HYPERCAPITALISM
WHERE ALL OF LIFE IS A PAID-FOR EXPERIENCE (2000).
179. Id. at 4.
180. Id.
18l. Id. at 10.
182. Id.





associated with sharing, in particular, the price of access, the cost of learning to
use unfamiliar products repeatedly, and the cost of searching for new prod-
ucts.18 4 Because access saves money, it might be perceived as the choice of the
poor, and therefore downplayed as a second-best solution for those who cannot
afford to own. This would be a mistake. First of all, in reality, access-based con-
sumption is actually favored by young people and average income house-
holds.8 * Moreover, if ownership is not available or made available to all, access
can be a reasonable option for certain types of assets. And, as the next Part ar-
gues, access is also a valuable normative alternative.
The second type of motivations involves ideological reasons. By choosing
access, users express a concern for sustainability and for future generational and
environmental goals. In addition, access is associated with the anti-
consumption trend and a flexible, modest, assets-free lifestyle."'
The structure of access and the social reasons for choosing it communicate
a choice, the choice not to have property, at least in the traditional sense. At the
extreme, it professes an alternative vision of self that may include an ecological
or political agenda, manifest in a lifestyle of flexibility and availability, and con-
structs different relations with others.1'8
184. Lamberton & Rose, supra note 127, at 111.
185. See, e.g., Rajesh Makwana, Reflections on the Future of the Sharing Economy, SHARE
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.sharing.org/information-centre/blogs/reflections
-future-sharing-economy [http://perma.cc/B5MW-UAA4] ("Evidence suggests
that most sharing economy activities attract mainly white middle class users.");
Ben Schiller, The Sharing Economy Isn't Just for Young Coastal Urbanites Any
More, FAST CO. (June 6, 2014), http://www.fastcompany.com/3031205/the-
sharing-economy-isnt-just-for-young-coastal-urbanites-any-more [http://perma
.cc/7AY2-8YRZ] ("The sharing economy has long been associated with certain
types and demographics: young, hipster, urban, middle class."); The Sharing Econ-
omy: Consumer Intelligence Series, PwC (2015), http://www
.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series
-the-sharing-economy.pdf. [http://perma.cc/ZU8B-T5XF] (identifying three
groups as the most excited about the sharing economy: adults aged 18-24, house-
holds with $50,000 to $75,000 in income, and people with children under 18 living
in their homes). Although the study indicates that there is a broad support for the
sharing economy across ages, incomes, and geographical location, it seems that
most of the supporters are young millennials. The economic downturn and the
thinning of the middle class are a possible explanation for this trend. Edward N.
Wolff et al., How Much Wealth Was Destroyed in the Great Recession?, in THE
GREAT RECESSION 127, 132 (David B. Grusky et al. eds., 2011).
186. See, e.g., JACOB LUND FISKER, EARLY RETIREMENT EXTREME: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE (2010) (advocating simple living
and frugality); see also Marcus Phipps et al., Understanding the Inherent Complexity
of Sustainable Consumption: A Social Cognitive Framework, 66 J. BuS. RES. 1227
(2013) (discussing the dynamic nature of sustainable consumption and the inter-
relation of environmental and behavioral factors).
187. See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 159, at 895.
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If ownership is about exclusion and control,'" and, as Morris Cohen fa-
mously put it, about sovereignty,'9 access is a choice not to engage in hierar-
chical relations. Nonetheless, in real life, most people choose a mixture of own-
ership and access. The social and conceptual alternative of access is mostly a
matter of degree, not an all-or-nothing preference. Moreover, as will be ex-
plained in the next Part, access depends on either ownership or some form of
public resource. It is not a stand-alone choice, but one that is part of the tapes-
try of property relations.
Looking from a broader perspective, access affects neighborhoods, trans-
portation, the environment, and housing policy.'90 The efficient level of access is
highly disputed, as are its long-term consequences.'91 We know too little as of
now to correctly measure and address all possible effects on markets.'9 This Ar-
ticle presents a normative argument about access and share as property forms.
It brackets other considerations. Once the theoretical contribution is accepted,
regulators will have to balance competing considerations in constructing legal
rules.
The legal scheme of access is primarily contractual. Facilitated by online
platforms, access builds on two legal relations: a private contract between the
owner and the user, and the platform's responsibility towards both owners and
users.93 Users locate an asset that fits their needs, contact the owner, and make
a transaction.194 A fee is paid to the platform by the user, the owner, or both.
Both owner and user are reviewed at the end of the transaction, using a reputa-
tional mechanism offered by the platform.95 In addition, certain platforms pro-
188. See supra Section I.A.
189. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8,12 (1927) ("The
extent of the power over the life of others which the legal order confers on those
called owners is not fully appreciated by those who think of the law as merely pro-
tecting men in their possession. Property law does more. It determines what men
shall acquire. Thus, protecting the property rights of a landlord means giving him
the right to collect rent, protecting the property of a railroad or a public service
corporation means giving it the right to make certain charges.").
190. Juliet Schor, Debating the Sharing Economy, GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE (2014),
http://greattransition.org/images/GTI-publications/SchorDebatingtheSharing
_Economy.pdf [http://perma.cc/ELZ5-C3PP] (evaluating the broad implications
of the sharing economy).
191. Id. (identifying various sharing economy consequences, including effects on sus-
tainability, social capital, and labor).
192. See sources cited supra note 2.
193. See, e.g., RENTYTHING, http://web.archive.org/web/20160304152335/http://
www.rentything.com/ (http://perma.cc/XHY2-F56K] (describing the role of own-
er, user, and platform).
194. Id.
195. See Eyal Ert et al., Trust and Reputation in the Sharing Economy: The Role of Per-




vide insurance for a number of risks involved in the transaction.'96 For example,
if a user is involved in a collision, Turo covers the damages by a liability insur-
ance policy.'97 Users can choose to pay for an insurance package that covers
physical damage and liability protection.9'
Nonetheless, owners and users experience certain legal obstacles. Obvious-
ly, any difficulty for the owner results in fewer owners offering their assets for
short-term access. These difficulties include first and foremost insurance prob-
lems. In particular, renting out cars for money violates most insurance policies
and is cause for denial of coverage.'" Many state regulators are not satisfied
with third-party insurance offered by platforms and require fuller coverage.oo
Another problem is a complicated tax system that makes sharing economy
transactions cumbersome.2 0' In addition, users face the threat of discrimination
nisms in the sharing economy and finding that photos are an important factor for
users); Paolo Parigi & Karen Cook, Trust and Relationships in the Sharing Econo-
my, 14 CONTEXTS 18 (2015) (explaining trust among strangers in the sharing
economy); Adam Thierer et al., How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Repu-
tational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the "Lemons Problem", 70 U. MIAMI L. REV.
830 (2016).
196. See, e.g., GetAround Insurance Policy, GETAROUND, http://www.getaround.com/
insurance [http://perma.cc/F32B-P4JX] ("Our insurance program provides auto
insurance to cover renters and vehicles that meet our Eligibility Requirements.
Coverage applies for the duration of each rental, from start to finish, and includes
liability, collision and comprehensive (e.g., fire, auto theft, vandalism) coverage.").
Platforms that facilitate rentals of personal possessions do not usually provide in-
surance. See Terms of Service, PEERBY, http://www.peerby.com/terms-and-
conditions [http://perma.cc/B9GW-AS7B] ("You are solely responsible for any
loss or damage suffered as a result of lending, leasing, distributing, borrowing,
renting, selling, or otherwise obtaining and/or using, any good or service via
Peerby."); Terms and Conditions of Service, RENTYTHING, http://web.archive.org/
web/20160312095341/https:/www.rentything.com/terms [http://perma.cc/DTW8
-G5DS].
197. Insurance & Protection, TuRO, http://turo.com/insurance [http://perma.cc/9SPW
-XJN7].
198. Id.
199. Herb Weisbaum, Car Sharing Hits Some Bumps In the Road, CNBC (June 5, 2013,
8:11 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100789535 [http://perma.cc/6PWL-XBW9]
("Most insurance companies don't allow policyholders to rent or otherwise use
their vehicle for commercial purposes."); see also M.P. McQueen, Beware the Lia-
bility of Sharing Your Car with Strangers, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2013, 2:20 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/investopedia/2013/10/15/beware-the-liability-of-
sharing-your-car-with-strangers/ [http://perma.cclP74U-XWR4].
200. Weisbaum, supra note 199.
201. Annelise Wiens, Five Tax Tips for Working in the Sharing Economy, H&R BLOCK
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by owners, as currently public accommodation law does not apply to sharing
economy businesses.o2 The next Part will address some of these problems.
2. Share
Share is a form of communal access. Many users prefer to use property as
part of a group to save costs and to interact with others in the community.203
There are a number cooperative forms of engaging with personal property that
typically do not include ownership.20 4 This Article focuses specifically on coop-
erative consumption that is a version of access.2 05
Share builds on the consumption trend of access, namely casual short-term
engagement with property and the choice not to own, but it gives it a commu-
nal spin. Community lending libraries2o6 make a good example. Toy lending li-
braries, for example, allow children and their parents to borrow toys, games,
202. See Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property, supra note 24 (discussing fair housing
and public accommodation laws in the sharing economy); see also Aaron Belzer &
Nancy Leong, The New Public Accommodations, 105 GEO. L. REv. 1271 (2017) (ar-
guing in favor of public accommodation reform in the sharing economy).
203. See generally Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Econ-
omy, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1 (2012). Community garden projects are one exam-
ple. See Efrat Eisenberg, The Changing Meaning of Community Space: Two Models
of NGO Management of Community Gardens in New York City, 36 INTER. J. URB. &
REGIONAL RES. 106 (2012) (discussing the creation of urban spaces and the in-
volvement of NGOs); Jane E. Schukoske, Community Development Through Gar-
dening: State and Local Policies Transforming Urban Space, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 351 (2000) ("Despite the prevalence of vacant land and the reality of urban
blight, many communities have been successful in transforming these dangerous
urban spaces into thriving community gardens."); Joan Twiss et al., Community
Gardens: Lessons Learned from California Healthy Cities and Communities, 93 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1435 (2003). Cooperatives are another example. See JOYCE
ROTHSCHILD & J. ALLEN WHITT, THE COOPERATIVE WORKPLACE: POTENTIALS AND
DILEMMAS OF ORGANISATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION (1986); Paulette L.
Stenzel, Connecting the Dots: Synergies Among Grassroots Tools for Authentic Sus-
tainable Development, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 393, 424-25 (2014).
204. Kassan & Orsi, supra note 203, at 3.
205. This makes share distinct from other forms of the commons. The commons can
refer to formal co-ownership. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 95. Additionally, the
commons can refer to other informal sharing of resources, such as a dormitory
room or the home. See ROBERT ELLICKSON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY Xii
(2d ed. 1995) (shared dormitory room as common property); Robert C. Ellickson,
Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1394-95 (1993) (multi-person households as
a form of limited-access "commons"); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Proper-
ty: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV.
129, 132 (1998). Another example is an entire village that shares a meadow. See
OSTROM, supra note 107, at 16, 64.
206. Not all libraries are community-oriented, but community-based libraries offer the




and puzzles.20 7 In some areas, toy libraries are connected to a program such as a
school, library, or hospital, but other libraries are community-based and run by
parent volunteers.0s Community-based libraries usually have specific borrow-
ing rules, membership fees,20 9 and responsibilities shared by members that in-
clude "assisting the librarian with issues and returns, helping new members and
processing any new toys."210 Toy libraries serve as a hub for the community, en-
gaging isolated families and providing a meeting place for families." According
to a recent empirical study, members enjoy the social benefits of active partici-
pation and develop a sense of belonging to the library.2 12
Tool libraries allow people to borrow various tools and, on some occasions,
provide a common working space.13 Tool libraries are "neighborhood hubs of-
fering classes, community building spaces, workshops and a variety of tools
ranging from belt sanders to lawnmowers and more."14 Clothing libraries are
another example, and allow members to borrow clothes for free or for a mem-
bership fee.' They satisfy the need for diversity and novelty in fashion without
207. Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 158, at 486 ("Toy lending libraries provide par-
ents with the opportunity to share communally owned toys in their local neigh-
bourhood and thus reduce their consumption of new toys. Toy sharing may be
particularly beneficial as young children often have limited attention spans, grow-




210. Member Responsibilities, KARORI TOY LIBRARY, http://www.karoritoylibrary.org
.nz/belonging [http://perma.cc/YE4R-3LBC).
211. Toy Libraries: Their Benefits for Children, Families and Communities, NAT'L Ass'N
OF TOY AND LEISURE LIBRARIES (2007), http://www.capacityltd.org.uk/
docs/ToyLibraryPressRelease.pdf [http://perma.cc/NZU2-X3P6]; see also Jane
Brodin & Eva Bjorck-Akesson, Toy Libraries/Lekoteks in an International Perspec-
tive, 2 EuROREHAB 97 (1992).
212. Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 158.
213. Johnson, supra note 136.
214. Id.
215. See Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 158, at 3 ("The clothing libraries offer con-
sumers access to a certain number of items during a limited period of time in ex-
change for contact information and most commonly a membership fee. Owner-
ship is thereby replaced with access to a shared pool of clothes."); Vedra Korobar,
The Interconnection of Sustainability and Collaborative Consumption: A Case
Study of Clothing Libraries 1 (2013) (unpublished M.Sci. thesis, Lund University)
(available online at http://1up.lub.1u.se/luur/download?func= download-
File&recordOld=3800323&fileOld=3800324 [http://perma.cc/23HX-WK48])
("Clothing library is a recently emerged concept based on the same principles as a
conventional books library where instead of books one can borrow clothes. Fol-
lowing the example of books libraries, the concept of clothing library has the ten-
dency to satisfy the desire for diversity and novelty in one's personal dressing style,
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overspending and overconsuming.'6 Studies of clothing libraries in Sweden
suggest that members tend to be environmentally conscious, supporters of col-
laborative consumption goals, and experience a sense of belonging and com-
mitment to other members and the project as a whole.17 This last finding stands
in stark contrast to the experience of members of Zipcar, a car-sharing enter-
prise that is a for-profit company."' In Zipcar, members enjoy the benefits of
access without having any attachment to the community or to the brand."9
It is clear, however, that community lending libraries are not new. Public
libraries and social clubs are also examples of community-based access. This Ar-
ticle does not necessarily claim that these examples are novel; rather, it address-
es a growing trend that gradually marks a decrease in the importance of owner-
ship.
Community libraries present an idiosyncratic model. Unlike community
gardens,"2 for example, the property itself is not the focal point of the commu-
nity. However, the community is not detached entirely from the property. The
focal point is the function and usability of the asset. It is not about the particu-
lar toy, it is about playing. It is not about a particular tool, but about renovation
and repair. Members can still feel attached to a garment or toy,221 but it is the
ability to choose from a pool of toys, tools, or clothes, use them sporadically
and casually borrow them when needed that characterizes these projects. Echo-
ing the slow erosion of ownership,m these projects are an opportunity to access
instead of own.
At the same time, community libraries, as opposed to other types of librar-
ies, offer more than access. While access could be understood in terms of liquid
relations to property,2 3 as a choice of nomadism, disassociated from communi-
ty and possession, share is actually a form of access that ties one to a communi-
ty. The property is a platform for commitment and ties rather than exclusion
and control. Members share responsibilities towards fellow members; they in-
teract with other members in meetings, events, or during the visit to the library
while at the same time maximising the potential of one garment, without neces-
sarily pressuring the need for more production and resource exploitation.").
216. Korobar, supra note 215, at 2, 4.
217. See generally Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 158; Korobar, supra note 215.
218. Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 159, at 890 (providing qualitative research that in-
cludes interviews with Zipcar users in Boston).
219. Id.
220. See sources cited supra note 203.
221. Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 158, at 35 (discussing members' favorite items).
222. See supra notes 161-166 and accompanying text.





and volunteer to assist in the day-to-day work.w Physical objects, such as toys,
clothes, or tools, lie at the core of these communal relations not because there is
a strong attachment to the property as a source of identity," not because of a
strong legal title, as is the case with co-ownership, but because the use facilitates
community ties. This use is at the same time individual (each member enjoys
the item personally) and shared.
The combination of casual use and strong communal ties has yet o be con-
sidered a valid form of engaging with property. Share involves member partici-
pation, access to items, and non-exclusive engagement with the asset. However,
the model is different than that for a common resource. The resource itself is
changing: assets can be lost and new ones purchased. Moreover, members can
leave their library easily, as they have no substantial financial involvement in the
project or a meaningful legal relation to the property. These attributes make
share a unique case of the commons. The next Part studies the legal background
and normative power of share and access.
III. RECOGNIZING ACCESS AND SHARE
Ownership is one of the pillars of modern legal systems.Y6 This Part con-
siders alternative ways in which people enjoy and use property and their differ-
ent economic, relational, and normative attributes. It further criticizes the legal
emphasis on ownership and long-term possession as the primary model for
property engagement.
Access and share are distinctively different from mainstream property. Ac-
cess therefore reflects a choice not to have property in the traditional sense. As
engagements with things are essentially a platform for different engagements
with other people," access and share reflect a relational choice as well. Owner-
224. See, e.g., Member Responsibilities, supra note 210; see also Ozanne & Ballantine,
supra note 158.
225. See infra Section III.A.1; cf Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Property Without Personhood, 47
SETON HALL L. REv. 771 (2017) (discussing the role of property as personhood in
the sharing economy).
226. See Honord, supra note 10, at 107 ("Ownership is one of the characteristic institu-
tions of human society"); Katz, supra note 45 (discussing the legal theory of own-
ership); see also PENNER, supra note 43; Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Ca-
thedral- The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997); Weinrib,
supra note 43; cf JAMES W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 5 (1996).
227. Property is essentially a platform of collaboration and sharing resources. See
sources cited supra note 95. Some argue that property cannot be adequately un-
derstood and theorized without considering the ways people share property and
cooperate in property-related projects. See generally Carol M. Rose, Property as
Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2
YALE J. L. & HuMAN. 37 (1990). Among those who see sharing as fundamentally
tied up with property, there are many theoretical and normative differences. Some
understand sharing as a central feature of ownership that ultimately depends on
the owner's will. See PENNER, supra note 43, at 5; see also Daniel B. Kelly, The Right
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ship creates hierarchical relations between the owner and the rest of the world
with respect to the thing owned.2" Access and share provide alternative models
that differ in their relational stance. Access represents detachment and share re-
flects cohesion. As opposed to recent consumer studies scholarship that docu-
ments the decline of ownership, this project does not focus primarily on con-
sumer identity,' 9 but equally considers the relational and normative aspects of
each particular choice. Both access and share prioritize use over title,230 and de-
value attachment to possession. The functionality of the thing serves as the plat-
form for interaction and not the essential qualities of the object.
The call to recognize access and share as normatively complex and nuanced
legal options is not a call to apply traditional property rules to these alternatives.
Property in the traditional sense is characterized by its unique in rem features,
as it affects a large group of unconnected people.231 Access and share are not
meant to mimic these features or enjoy similar protection to ownership or pos-
session. On the contrary, this Article celebrates the uniqueness of alternative
forms and avoids the temptation to fit them into an unsuitable category. Acces-
sors do not exert control over assets and traditionally do not affect third parties'
interests. They prefer to casually use personal property in a consistent manner.
What makes it property then? I suggest we focus on the ways individuals
use, enjoy, and engage with property. In this sense, the argument returns to the
thingness of property as a central feature of the institution.32 This focus on
things is not necessarily about promoting use, preventing use conflicts or saving
to Include, 63 EMORY L. J. 857 (2014). Others stress dependency as a core feature of
property. See generally Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Pefialver, Properties of
Communities, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 127 (2009). Relational accounts insist that
property constructs relationships and does not just set boundaries. See Nedelsky,
supra note 95. Dagan and Heller claim that the sharing of property that successful-
ly builds on cooperation with others strengthens interpersonal relations and is a
good in and of itself. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 95.
228. See Cohen, supra note 189; see also Dorfman, supra note 45 (arguing that property
is a special authority relation between an owner and a nonowner); Larissa Katz,
The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution in Property
Law, 55 MCGILL L.J. 47, 50-51 (2010) ("An owner authoritatively coordinates uses
of an object by setting the agenda for it.").
229. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
230. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REv. 347
(1967) (arguing that private property is best suited to deal with possible externali-
ties); see also Dyal-Chand, supra note 96; Pefialver, supra note 23.
231. See sources cited supra note 74.
232. See Yunchien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus
Common Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 4 (2012) ("Property serves our
interests in using things-this is the reason we have property. Other desirable fea-
tures of property-its promotion of stability, autonomy, investment incentives,
fairness, and efficiency-all trace back to this basic interest in the use of things.");





information costs, as Henry Smith has argued.33 Rather, the claim is that things
function as platforms for achieving personal goals and interacting with others.
Furthermore, access is important for the study of property precisely because it
provides a normative alternative to ownership and possession, and might be
viewed as a choice not to have property. Studying its contribution and risks is
important to the study of property. It invites a discussion on the intricate ways
property institutions evolve depending on social and economic develop-
ments.234
In addition, access, share and ownership are interconnected. When people
choose to access a car but own a home,2 35 this choice validates both ownership
and its core values and access and its core values at the same time. It reflects a
variety of options, and an array of possible engagements with property. When
ownership is the only revered option both socially and legally, it becomes the
default position, not a distinct choice.
If this characterization is convincing, we are left to wonder why we do not
think of access as simply a contractual relationship.236 Indeed, access is mostly
based, at least primarily, on contracts. This is a reasonable and quite efficient
choice. Multiple and conflicting property rights may result in the tragedy of the
anti-commons.37 However, contract law alone is not an adequate characteriza-
tion of access and share for two main reasons. First, contracts do not take into
account the public function of property, and its normative value of recogni-
tion.38 Second, contract law cannot address the legal obstacles set by insurance
policies or zoning law. 39 Moreover, it is important to consider access within the
property discourse because it provides an alternative form of engaging with
possessions. It therefore inspires a discussion about the ways that property
evolves in response to social and economic changes.
233. Henry Smith argues that "it is the mediation of a thing that helps give property its
in rem character-availing against persons generally." Smith, supra note 78, at
1691. It is an information cost perspective that protects use interests. The argu-
ment in this Article is different. It does not incentivize use per se, but perceives
property as multiple forms of use and enjoyment of things by individuals and
communities.
234. Several studies examine the ways property evolves. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, Transi-
tion Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 359 (2002); Eduardo M. Pefialver
& Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PENN. L. REv. 102 (2007).
235. See Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 158.
236. On the distinction between property and contract, see generally Merrill & Smith,
The Property/Contract Interface, supra note 74.
237. See generally Heller, supra note 42.
238. See Davidson, supra note 93, at 1638.
239. See infra Section III.B.
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A. Property Values
Freedom, personhood, efficiency, and community have all been associated
with property.24o This Part demonstrates that these property values support
other engagements with property, but with an important twist. While owner-
ship and long-term possession secure control and attachment, access and share
support mobility and flexibility. Instead of personhood, access and share sup-
port the ability to experiment with one's personality. Instead of freedom from
intervention, access provides the freedom from being tied down. This Part also
explains that the influential bundle of sticks approach can be reconfigured to
support access and share. This Part then considers the normative problems with
access. These values and concerns are instrumental in setting forth a normative
vision of access and share.
1. Personhood
Personhood as a justification for property emphasizes how controlling as-
sets contributes to self-development and shapes and reflects identity.4 ' There
are two main arguments here. Hegelians emphasize communal recognition of
one's control over property.?4 Radin, on the other hand, emphasizes attach-
ments to possession.2 43 Both accounts assume that long-term engagement with
property is conducive to personhood. Access and share are potentially also en-
tangled with personality and identity, but in a very different way.
Short-term casual engagement with assets manifests a different form of
identity construction." Consumer researchers see access as symbolizing mobil-
ity, flexibility, and openness to change.45 Accessors focus on the function of the
object and its usability, and an experience of use replaces the need for symbolic
expression.'6 Some scholars argue that access builds an ecological, anti-
240. See supra Section I.A.
241. See supra note 50-55 and accompanying text.
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
244. Cf. Belk, Extended Self in a Digital World, supra note 162, at 494 ("As argued and
demonstrated here, the concept of the extended self is alive and well in the digital
world, but there are a number of differences. There are many new possessions and
technologies through which we present and extend our self, and they operate quite
differently than in predigital days. They also create different ways through which
we can meet, interact with, and extend our aggregate selves through other people
while experiencing a transcendent sense that we are part of something bigger than
us alone."); see also Belk, You Are What You Can Access, supra note 138.
245. Bardhi et al., supra note 166, at 513; cf JOHN TOMLINSON, GLOBALIZATION AND
CULTURE (1999) (discussing deterritorialization).
246. Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 159, at 895 ("If not having a car is no longer tied to
status loss, since it is a decision made on 'smart' grounds rather than on non-




consumerist self that shapes personal identity.47 The problem with this descrip-
tion is that it risks idealizing consumer choices, mistakenly conflating con-
sumption and identity." Instead of fetishizing possession, one of the dangers of
general personhood theories,2 49 we risk fetishizing consumption.
Yet part of the identity-building role of access and share relies on the cur-
rent symbolic function of ownership. Whereas ownership connotes stability and
attachment, access allows users to experiment.2"o When children exchange toys
in toy lending libraries, studies show that boys are willing to try toys that are
typically associated with girls, and less active children become more physical in
their play.5 1 When one purchases toys, there is a financial commitment and an
expectation that the toy will fit the taste and character of the child."' Children
and parents may limit themselves to the more conservative choices. Property as
identity can limit our options and access has a liberating function. It reopens
choices and allows us to experiment with our preferences. Inasmuch as owner-
ship supports personhood, access creates a strikingly different alternative that
marks the anti-attachment o possessions.
Nestor Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REv. 757 (2009) (ana-
lyzing property as projecting relative status).
247. Sam Binkley, Liquid Consumption: Anti-Consumerism and the Fetishized De-
fetishization of Commodities, 22 CULTURAL STUD. 599, 599 (2008) ("Consumers to-
day are increasingly asked to look beyond consumer capitalism's drab seriality and
moral vacuity, to seek deeper meanings to wider life problems in a range of niche-
marketed products bearing the stamp of rebellion, authenticity, simplicity, eco-
nomic justice and ecological responsibility- a development that has led researchers
from varied backgrounds to speculate about the political and ethical possibilities
afforded by a changing culture of consumption.").
248. Id.
249. Radin, supra note 17, at 961. But see Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragma-
tism: A Critique of Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REv. 347,
373-74 (1993) (critiquing Radin by emphasizing the connection between property
as personhood and social power).
250. Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 158, at 488.
251. Id. at 489.
252. See generally Donald W. Ball, Toward a Sociology of Toys: Inanimate Objects, Social-
ization, and the Demography of the Doll World, 8 Soc. Q. 447 (1967); cf Joel Best,
Too Much Fun: Toys as Social Problems and the Interpretation of Culture, 21
SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 197 (1998). Toys also foster gender, see Elizabeth Sweet,
Boy Builders and Pink Princesses: Gender, Toys, and Inequality over the Twenti-
eth Century (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California Da-
vis), racial identification, see Erika Engstrom, Toys and Games: Racial Stereotypes
and Identity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENDER IN THE MEDIA 393 (Mary Kosut ed.,
2012), and reflect personality traits such as a tendency towards activity, imagina-
tion or puzzles, see Donna Fisher-Thompson et al., Toy Selection for Children: Per-
sonality and Toy Request Influences, 33 SEx ROLEs 239 (1995).
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. 2. Freedom
Freedom is one of the core values associated with ownership. This Section
examines two main freedom-based justifications for property. One of the cen-
tral justifications for property concerns property's traits as a physical spatiality.
Property is a private space that is construed as free from interference of both the
state and private actors.53 This spatial argument emphasizes control and exclu-
sion as a way to draw boundaries between what is mine and what is outside my
control.25 4 Access, on the other hand, emphasizes freedom from being confined
to a particular spatiality and defined by it.2 Instead of property being the
source of protection, attachment, and commitment, it becomes an opportunity
for flexibility and choice. Indeed, the spatial argument tying freedom and prop-
erty together neglects the domineering nature of ownership and space on the
owner. The more property people have, the more tied down they are to a par-
ticular time, place, and community.51 Ownership entails stability257 whereas ac-
cess is a more fluid choice. Both can be associated with freedom, but they are
very different forms of freedom. The first, more familiar sense of freedom is
about being left alone in a physical space; the second is about freedom from be-
ing tied down, and the ability to choose your spatiality and constantly change it.
As opposed to access, share is about a connection to the community and in-
spires less flexibility and fluidity.
These two forms of freedom are, in some sense, codependent. In order for
freedom from interference to be meaningful and contribute to a person's au-
tonomy, a person has to choose this type of connection and prefer it to the flex-
ibility access affords. And access is rarely a purist choice, because most people
253. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., Barros, supra note 71, at 259-76 (discussing safety, freedom, and privacy
in the home).
255. See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 159, (arguing that access allows consumers to
be flexible about lifestyle and identity); Bardhi et al., supra note 166, at 511 (dis-
cussing nomadic lifestyle and the necessity of mobility- "nomadic people value de-
tachment and flexibility, have diminished interest in ownership, and eschew at-
tachments that inhibit their freedom of movement. A detached relationship to
possessions and places is a central feature of nomadic cultures and mentality, and
it is one that reinforces their mobility. Materialism in general is seen as producing
'bumps in the road' during mobility").
256. See generally Pefialver, supra note 23.
257. Lynda Cheshire et al., The Politics of Housing Consumption: Renters as Flawed Con-
sumers on a Master Planned Estate, 47 URB. STUD. 2597, 2599 (2010) (suggesting
that ownership promotes ontological security); cf Shelley Mallett, Understanding
Home: A Critical Review of the Literature, 52 Soc. REV. 62, 66 (2004) (arguing that
governments promote homeownership as creating stability in order to shift the
burden of welfare to the family). It has similarly been suggested that home owner-
ship ideology promotes a property-based citizenship, privileging home ownership
over public and rental housing. See generally RICHARD RONALD, THE IDEOLOGY OF




choose to own certain assets and access others, and create their own slate of
property uses.2s
The second justification for property based on freedom concerns unre-
strained power.259 Reich explains that property entitlements protect citizens
from the power of the state.2"o As the state becomes more powerful, individuals
need more protection. Reich therefore called for propertization of state benefits,
licenses, contracts, and franchises to shield citizens from this particular form of
power.261 Fifty years after Reich's work, Pefialver explains that private power has
become a serious threat to freedom."' Employers and mortgagees have consid-
erable power over individuals, and this power demands protection as well."'
Pefialver, following Reich, considers how varying definitions of power change
the theoretical and normative foundation of property. I argue that access is an-
other form of property that responds to power, but in a different way.
The power I refer to is corporate power.4 This is much more than simply
economic power, as corporations shape the private and public spheres." Mul-
tinational corporations have immense cultural influence.' Brands, not simply
products, encourage consumption of new items that are meant to shape indi-
viduals' identity as consumers."' Cultural and economic corporate power leads
to overconsumption, dilution of resources, and economic difficulties for indi-
viduals. The choice of access is in part a reaction to these developments. Access
or share can be understood as an anti-market consumption strategy, a way for
consumers to diminish the power of brand and consumer identity."' Instead of
buying products in traditional markets, access and share promote the reuse of
current supplies. Market avoidance is one of the motivations for participating
in share, as a form of communal access.269 Access also promotes the reuse of ex-
isting products as an alternative to purchasing new ones. Understood as such,
258. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
260. Reich, supra note 63, at 733.
261. Id.
262. See Pefialver, supra note 69.
263. Id. at 34, 38-40.
264. See Ronit Donyets-Kedar, Rethinking Responsibility in Private Law, in
PRIVATIZATION, VULNERABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 34 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2017).
265. Id.
266. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES (2000)
(criticizing the central role of corporations and brands in modern society).
267. Id. at 7-8.
268. See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 159, at 885.
269. Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 158.
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access and share can also be a form of freedom, moderately responding to the
private power of corporations in shaping social, cultural, and economic codes.
3. Efficiency
The concept of property rights and ownership is also supported by efficien-
cy considerations. One example is the famous work by Harold Demsetz, who
claimed that private ownership creates the necessary incentives for wealth max-
imization and efficient use of property.270 A second example was discussed ear-
lier and concerns the information costs associated with in rem rights.7' This Ar-
ticle does not set out to dispute the possible advantages of these arguments,"'
but argues that other forms of property engagement promote efficiency as well.
Access and share promote efficient use of resources in two important ways.
First, some assets have underused excess capacity when they are privately owned
and consumed.'2 Because this excess capacity remains unused, these assets are
systematically underexploited. Suppose Paul only uses his car on weekdays but
never on weekends.'74 During the weekend the car is simply parked in the
driveway. Private cars typically have limited usage per household. According to
one estimate, cars spend about 90 percent of their time parked in parking lots.75
Car sharing allows owners to maximize the utility of the property.1' This ra-
tionale is not restricted to cars. Personal items such as drills, ladders, and
lawnmowers are individually owned but infrequently used. Many such items are
underutilized, and much of their potential economic benefit is wasted.'" Ac-
cess, as well as certain types of share, exploits the excess capacity of assets. Ra-
270. See generally Demsetz, supra note 230; see also James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory
and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 139 (2009).
271. See generally Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 74.
272. For select critiques of Demsetz's work, see Dyal-Chand, supra note 96; Pefialver,
supra note 23.
273. Benkler, supra note 124, at 276.
274. Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 24, at 76.
275. Eun Ji Cho & Liat Rogel, Urban Social Sustainability Through the Web: Using ICTs
To Build a Community for Prospective Neighbors, in ICT4S 2013: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGIES FOR SUSTAINABILITY 167, 168 (Lorenz Hilty et al., 2013).
276. Id.
277. See Benkler, supra note 124, at 276 (defining "shareable goods" as goods that "sys-
tematically have excess capacity" and sugesting that "that this excess capacity may
better be harnessed through sharing relations than through secondary markets.");
see also Anders Fremstad, Gains from Sharing: Sticky Norms, Endogenous Prefer-
ences, and the Economics of Shareable Goods (U. Mass. Amherst Econ. Dep't Work-





ther than being used by the owner and her family alone, the asset is accessible to
multiple users on a when-needed basis.
Second, access can be an efficient way to use goods compared to ownership
when its benefits exceed its costs. The benefits of access include a lower cost
compared to purchasing the object, the flexibility of using items in different lo-
cations, and saving storage costs because storage is the owner's responsibility."'
They also include psychological gains, if the user wishes to support -sustainabil-
ity and deny the traditional market ownership model. 79 At the same time, there
are also costs associated with access. These costs include the price of the object,
the cost of learning to use unfamiliar products repeatedly, and the cost of
searching for and finding new products."a
While transaction costs for access and share used to be considerable, new
technologies, reputation mechanisms, and the role of online platforms have
significantly lowered the costs for short-term use of personal assets." Reduced
costs allow owners and users to benefit from excess capacity of the property eas-
ily and efficiently.2 The analysis can be further complicated to include exter-
nalities and additional costs and benefits. The review provided here demon-
strates that access includes significant economic benefits.
4. Bundle of Sticks
The bundle of sticks approach celebrates the fragmentation of property us-
es.283 However, it typically focuses on rights, privileges, or liability with regard to
a given property. In contrast, access and share are forms of casual use. Suppose
an accessor uses John's car today and Jill's car next week. Each use is in fact a
short-term license, easily characterized by the law. However, access and share
are more than the sum of their respective uses. While renting cars from Zipcar
or tools from Home Depot could be characterized as a subscription, peer-to-
peer access cannot be similarly conceptualized. They are a form of consistent
use that is not dependent on a particular object. As such, access and share do
not fit comfortably with the bundle of sticks approach.
In order to consider access within the bundle of sticks approach, a broader
look is required. A dynamic approach to the bundle of sticks that acknowledges
property's function as a public institution makes room for reevaluation.8 For
example, an interest of consistent and dispersed use could be introduced. Yet,
this conclusion is problematic. Access is not analytically a right. It is a choice of
278. Lamberton & Rose, supra note 127, at 111.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See Benkler, supra note 124, at 276.
282. Id.
283. See supra Section I.A.4.
284. See Davidson, supra note 93.
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use. In order to protect and secure access, the law has to ensure there are a vari-
ety of options, and this goal is far from the standard property protection. Access
and share are thus best understood as alternatives to property that are evaluated
in light of property's justifications and values.
5. Community
Property and community are inseparably linked. Prominent theories stress
the interdependence of property and community, ownership and obligations,
individual rights and commitment." This interconnection of property and
community has a significant spatial component. Property builds, creates, and
shapes community, because people who share a space gradually become meshed
together.16 Whether people are sharing a home, a condominium, a neighbor-
hood,"7 or even a workspace, property's spatiality contributes to communal
ties.' The more property people have, real and personal, the more tied down
to a place they become. This physical presence cultivates an attachment to a
particular community. Homeownership is a striking example. When one owns
a home, she also gains access to social goods such as "schools, parks, sidewalks
and neighborhood-based social networks"'9 that further connect her to her
community. Property ties owners to a space not only physically, but also sym-
bolically. People who migrate to different countries sometimes keep possessions
285. See generally Alexander, supra note 97; Alexander & Pefialver, supra note 18; Ale-
xander & Pefialver, supra note 227; see also David Lametti, The Objects of Virtue, in
PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 1 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Pefialver eds.,
2010); Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property as Entrince, 91 VA. L. REv. 1889 (2005).
286. Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 48 (arguing that living with others and sharing the inti-
mate spatiality of home creates a property community). For critical accounts of
space and society, see IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE, 226-56 (1990); Davina Cooper, Regard Between Strangers: Diversity,
Equality and the Reconstruction ofPublic Space, 18 CRITICAL Soc. POL'Y 465 (1998).
287. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE
HEARTH (2008) (analyzing decision-making mechanisms in the home); AMNON
LEHAVI, THE CONSTRUCTION OF PROPERTY NORMS, INSTITUTIONS, CHALLENGES
(2013) (discussing common interest communities); Robert C. Ellickson, Unpack-
ing the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L. J. 226
(2006); Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 48; Amnon Lehavi, How Property Can Create,
Maintain, or Destroy Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 43 (2009); Shai Stern,
Taking Community Seriously: Lessons from the Israeli Disengagement Plan, 47 ISR. L.
REv. 149 (2014).
288. Pefialver, supra note 23, at 838 ("[O]wnership of property in a particular commu-
nity creates and reinforces social ties among neighbors, the maintenance of which





as a way to maintain a connection to their former community or family.290
Owning property therefore comes with privileges and attachments.
The alternative of share also ties members to a community. Although the
objects that are being exchanged and used are not important on their own, 9 '
lending facilities and sharing locations support community. They are among
the social goods that a neighborhood or city offers.
Access, on the other hand, marks a somewhat mixed form of sociability. At
first blush, access can serve to support an existing community within a neigh-
borhood. Drills, bikes, ladders, and other possessions are mostly accessed in
nearby locations.2 92 Access therefore strengthens ties within a community,
without the burden of stable ownership. However, access also encapsulates the
potential for a different kind of connection. While ownership often connects
people to their friends, family, and neighbors, access allows for casual interac-
tions with strangers. The home, car, drill, or bike becomes a platform for inter-
action with more than just intimate friends, but also with people from different
backgrounds.93 Car sharing and access to available rooms via Airbnb encourage
social interaction that includes personal exchanges of goods and money in a
way that potentially crosses ages, races, and income levels.2 94 The sharing econ-
omy as a phenomenon allows both owners and accessors to interact with others.
Such interactions are casual, short, and often trivial. Yet they facilitate a broad
spectrum of social networks. Flexible networks allow for the ability to change
location, and be more adaptable and less accountable to others. Finally, sustain-
ability and ecological awareness serve as a marker of belonging to an environ-
mental community.95
There are two contrasting forms of community embedded in access. The
first ties the accessor to a physical or ideological community. The second form
is characterized by openness to others and a willingness to interact with multi-
290. See generally Soren Askegaard et al., Postassimilation Ethnic Consumer Research:
Qualifications and Extensions, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 160 (2005); Russel W. Belk,
Moving Possessions: An Analysis Based on Personal Documents from the 1847-1869
Mormon Migration, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 339 (1992); Annamma Joy & Ruby Roy
Dholakia, Remembrances of Things Past: The Meaning of Home and Possessions of
Indian Professionals in Canada, 6 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 385 (1991). But see
Bardhi et al., supra note 166 (discussing liquid relations to assets in global nomad-
ism).
291. See supra notes 206-225 and accompanying text.
292. See Cho & Rogel, supra note 275, at 168; see also PEERBY, http://www.peerby.com
[http://perma.cc/L3PL-8N8S]; Siegler, supra note 12.
293. Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 24, at 101-03.
294. But see Benjamin G. Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of
Airbnb.com (Hary. Bus. Sch. Negot., Org. & Mkts. Unit, Working Paper No. 14-
054, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377353 [http://perma.cc/JQ2T-LD6Q]
(finding discrimination against black hosts in Airbnb transactions).
295. See generally Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 159.
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ple groups of people, in an unattached and casual way. Together they create an
interesting complexity that marks a unique alternative to ownership.
6. Normative Concerns
Alongside its benefits, access raises significant normative concerns with re-
lation to property values. Although access can support a broad spectrum of
networks, there is a concern that it will commodify community ties.196 Neigh-
borly behavior will be replaced by commercial transactions.97 If in the past,
people in need could ask their neighbors to give them the occasional ride,9' be-
cause of the pervasiveness of taxi or Uber services, it is no longer an appropriate
request. Similarly, if people typically rent drills, bikes, and ladders for money,99
they will feel uncomfortable to borrow these items from neighbors free of
charge. The existence of prevailing access-based services will change social
norms, chipping away at neighborly kindness, piece by piece, and replacing it
with monetary transactions.
This is an important concern. It could be partially mitigated by encourag-
ing share as a form of communal access over independent access.3oo At the same
time, one must keep in mind that neighborly kindness is a matter of luck. Some
people enjoy the benefits of reciprocal neighborly assistance more than others
do. The more different an individual happens to be, the less able they are to fit
in.3ol Herein lies the tradeoff. Access opens up possibilities but also compromis-
es attachment. For this reason, access is usually mixed with other forms of use
such as possession, ownership or communal consumption.
296. Commodification concerns arise in various legal contexts. See ELIZABETH
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 141 (1993); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 290-93 (1999); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES 137-38 (1996); I. Glenn Cohen, The Price of Everything, the Value of
Nothing: Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2003);
Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, 29 VA. TAX REv. 93 (2009); Kimberly D.
Krawiec, A Woman's Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1742-43 (2010); Elizabeth S.
Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109
(2009); Katharine Silbaugh, Testing as Commodification, 35 WASH U. J.L. & POL'Y
309 (2011).
297. Cf Paul Webley & Stephen E. G. Lea, The Partial Unacceptability of Money in Re-
paymentfor Neighborly Help, 46 HuM. BEHAV. 65 (1993).
298. Cf Barry Wellman & Scot Wartley, Different Strokes from Different Folks: Commu-
nity Ties and Social Support, 96 AM. J. SOC. 558 (1990) (addressing the services
provided by physically accessible ties).
299. See supra Section II.B.
300. See supra Part II (comparing access and share and highlighting the communal at-
tributes of share).
301. Cf Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Social Capital and Community Governance,
112 ECON. J. 419, 427-28 (2002) (discussing communities' tendency to be relatively




There is an additional concern. Access supports mobility and flexibility, but
it costs the individual in stability and independence.3o2 An access-centered life-
style choice will include living in micro-units with month-to-month leases,3o3
using car sharing instead of owning a car,304 and renting personal property
when needed.3 5 Individuals who choose this lifestyle are vulnerable to immedi-
ate changes in their health or financial stability. In fact, the choice of access is
largely embedded in the current economic climate of insecurity.3o6 Taken to its
extreme, access is a choice for the young and the healthy. Indeed, access is a
choice not to have property; an alternative that promotes both vulnerability and
freedom. For this reason, it could be chosen on occasion or serve as a lifestyle
choice for particular people at specific points in their lives, for example, young
people who wish to experiment.
Because access compromises stability and attachment, individuals are less
likely to demonstrate the responsibility that usually accompanies ownership.3 o7
Property mistreatment and a disregard for the community are possible byprod-
ucts of the access revolution.308 Some of these concerns can be controlled by lo-
cal regulations, and mistreatment of property is mitigated by a reputational
mechanism in peer-to-peer markets.30 9 Yet the conceptual problem persists in
that responsibility derives not from attachment to property and the stability it
affords, but from a general sense of duty, if one exists.
302. Cf Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 72. A different version of instability in prop-
erty concerns multiple eviction in low-income housing. This type of instability is
fundamentally tied to insecurity and distress. See MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED:
POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2016).
303. David Friedlander, WeLive Marries Micro-Apartments, Coworking, Magic, LIFE
EDITED (July 28, 2014), http://www.1ifeedited.com/welive-marries-micro
-apartments-coworking-magic [http://perma.cc/J45Q-3GA9]; Daniel J. Sernovitz,
WeWork Bullish on D.C.'s Tech Outlook, WASH. Bus. J. (Feb. 26, 2014, 10:45 AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/blog/techflash/2014/02/wework-bullish
-on-dcs-tech-outlook.html [http://perma.cc/ELD4-3CUC].
304. John Infranca, Spaces for Sharing: Micro Units Amid the Shift from Ownership to
Access, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2016) (discussing developers' expectation that
micro-units lessees will not own a car).
305. See, e.g., Siegler, supra note 12.
306. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
307. See generally Eduardo M. Pefialver, The Illusionary Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 191 (2010) (arguing that restrictions on abandoning property demonstrate a
vision of ownership that is suffuse with obligations to the public).
308. Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 159, at 891 (showing that Zipcar users demonstrat-
ed negative reciprocity towards other users).
309. Id. Bardhi & Eckhardt studied a commercial company, Zipcar, and not peer-to-
peer markets with a developed reputational mechanism; see also supra note 195
and accompanying text.
203
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Finally, platforms are an almost inseparable part of access. They control in-
formation, provide guidelines and facilitate the transaction.3o The power of
online platforms today is overwhelming and the threat of loss of privacy is ever
looming.31 1 This concern requires regulation of platforms, including securing
access without surveillance. Indeed, conceptualizing the role of platforms as le-
gal actors and regulating their power is becoming an important part of support-
ing access in the future.312
B. Access: The Choice not to Have Property
The previous Section demonstrated that access promotes important values
associated with property, namely freedom, personhood, community, and effi-
ciency, and raises concerns for independency, stability, privacy, and neighborly
relations. This Section builds upon this argument by developing a legal frame-
work for recognizing and supporting access.
This Article offers a broad perspective of alternatives to use, enjoy, and en-
gage with property, based on the view that property means the law of things.3
If we think of property as not necessarily sovereignty,314 or in rem rights,3 5 but
as forms of engagement with assets, we can begin to see the different alterna-
tives that are out there. Each alternative-share, own, access-has its own bene-
fits and drawbacks. Different alternatives are suitable for different types of as-
sets, and of course, different people have distinct preferences regarding various
310. Cf Einat Albin, From Required and Unlimited Intimacy to Troubling Unfree Labor:
The Case of Domestic Workers, 39 TEL Aviv U. L. REv. 369 (2016) (arguing that
platforms constitute intimacy in an essentially marketplace transaction); Dyal-
Chand, supra note 2 (analyzing the role of platforms and characterizing them as
creating a different mode of capitalism).
311. See, e.g., Gabriel R. Schlabach, Privacy in the Cloud: The Mosaic Theory and the
Stored Communications Act, 67 STAN. L. REv. 677, 687 (2015) ("[T]he business
strategies of many major Internet service providers, most notably Google, depend
on acquiring as much information as possible about their customers from multi-
ple sources and combining these data into centralized records, which these com-
panies can use for a variety of purposes, including targeted advertising.").
312. See generally Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in
the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. DIALOGUE 117 (2015) (argu-
ing, in the context of platforms, that "self-regulation can form part of a broader
innovation-enhancing solution, providing guidelines for sharing-economy regula-
tion that draw from self-regulatory experiences in industries ranging from nuclear
power and financial intermediation to chemical production and cotton supply");
Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REv. 88 (2016) (describing the
rise of the sharing economy as disruptive and arguing for rethinking current regu-
lation in light of the increasing innovative role of platforms).
313. See Grey, supra note 232; Penner, supra note 41; Smith, supra note 78.
314. Katz, supra note 45 (discussing owners as agenda setters for a thing); see also Co-
hen, supra note 189.




assets.31 6 Yet the law currently supports ownership to the exclusion of access.317 I
argue that the law should support access with a complex set of regulatory rules
that address some of its problems.
How could the law support access? The first thing to understand is that ac-
cess is not an independent form of engagement. It depends on the existence of
an owner, either private or public, who is willing to share her property, often in
exchange for money.38 Because access involves short-term use, it requires an
asset that can be used from some pool of resources, often private owners look-
ing to make some extra money.319 In order to support and facilitate access, the
state has to ensure a reliable and steady flow of assets available for short-term
casual use, thus enabling individuals not to have property, or at least not to have
particular types of property. This can be done in four principal ways that will be
explained shortly. First, the law has to consider the incentives for owners wish-
ing to share property with accessors. Specifically, negative externalities notwith-
standing, it needs to reevaluate barriers in existing insurance codes or in tax law
that burden these owners.32o Second, the law has to apply antidiscrimination
law to owners who share their property with accessors. Third, the law has to
continue to protect short-term possession against wrongdoers. Fourth, because
access also creates vulnerabilities and concerns, regulations have to address the
problems that accompany the support of access. Finally, this Part offers some
preliminary thoughts regarding the proportion of share, own, and access (i.e.,
the portion of each of these options in comparison to one another). These legal
steps will fulfill the state's responsibility to support access as an alternative to
ownership.
1. Removing Barriers
Owners who wish to utilize their property's excess capacity face various
regulatory barriers. Insurance codes, tax law, business permits, and zoning or-
316. See Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 158; supra note 160 and accompanying text.
317. The law protects possession from wrongful interference with a possessory interest.
See Dorfman, supra note 9. It protects owners from takings without due process.
See generally Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Hanoch Dagan, Tak-
ings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REv. 741 (1999); Thomas Merrill, The Land-
scape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000); William B. Stoebuck, A
General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972). And it protects
from unlawful search and seizure. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . .
318. See Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 24, at 78-80.
319. Id.
32o. As explained earlier, the Article presents theoretical and conceptual arguments
that contribute important considerations for regulation. It does not include other
significant considerations, such as the effect on communities and markets. See su-
pra notes 190-191 and accompanying text.
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dinances all burden the owner with legal requirements.32 Some of these regula-
tions serve to ensure that owners internalize negative externalities regarding
safety, cleanliness, and density.3 1 Yet when an agency makes the decision
whether or not to enforce a particular regime, or enact a new rule, it has to con-
sider the normative benefits and costs of access as an alternative for the use and
enjoyment of property. There are examples of regulations that create a chilling
effect for owners, who may choose not to share their property as a result.
One of the most pressing problems is insurance for car-sharing enterprises.
Personal vehicle insurance policies are generally invalid when a car is rented or
leased to others.32 3 Using one's car for commercial purposes often leads to can-
cellation of insurance coverage in many states.3? According to Loretta Worters,
vice president of communications at the Insurance Information Institute,
"some insurers view car-sharing services as a higher risk, so they may cancel or
not renew a driver's car insurance policy or increase premiums if a policyhold-
er's vehicle is involved in an accident while it's being rented."321
The states of California, Oregon, and Washington have passed new laws in
recent years to protect car owners who wish to share their vehicles.326 These laws
321. See Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 24, at 107.
322. See Samuel Nadler, The Sharing Economy: What is It and Where is It Going? (un-
published M.B.A. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2014),
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/90223 [http://perma.cc/ET84-C435].
323. Ingrid Ballls-Armet et al., Peer-to-Peer Carsharing: Exploring Public Perception and
Market Characteristics in the San Francisco Bay Area, California, 2416 TRANSP. RES.
REC. 27, 28 (2014).
324. Id. See also Ron Lieber, Share a Car, Risk Your Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (March 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/your-money/auto-insurance/enthusi
astic-about-car-sharing-your-insurer-isnt.html [http://perma.cc/5DXH-WKQH].
325. Jay MacDonald, Auto Insurance Risks of Car Sharing, BANKRATE (Nov. 23, 2011),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/insurance/auto-insurance-risks-car-sharing
-1.aspx [http://perma.cc/7WF2-PN3Z].
326. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.24 (West 2017) (providing that "[n]o private passen-
ger motor vehicle insured by its owner pursuant to a policy of insurance subject to
Section 11580.1 or 11580.2 shall be classified as a commercial vehicle, for-hire ve-
hicle, permissive use vehicle, or livery solely because its owner allows it to be used
for personal vehicle sharing," and stating that conditions include that the sharing
is conducted according to a personal vehicle sharing program and that the annual
revenue does not exceed the annual expenses of owning and operating the vehi-
cle); OR. REV. STAT. § 742.595 (2017) ("An owner's insurance policy for a private
passenger motor vehicle may not be canceled, voided, terminated, rescinded or
nonrenewed solely on the basis that the vehicle has been made available for per-
sonal vehicle sharing pursuant to a personal vehicle sharing program that is in
compliance with the provisions of ORS 742.585 to 742.600."); WASH. REV. CODE §
48.175.030 (2017) ("A private passenger motor vehicle insured by the vehicle's
registered owner under an owner's insurance policy may not be classified as a
commercial motor vehicle or for-hire motor vehicle solely because the vehicle's




prohibit insurers from classifying personal vehicles that are shared with acces-
sors as commercial use.327 In other states, owners who engage in car sharing are
at risk that insurance companies may classify their car as altering the owner's
risk profile, which may result in insurance premium spikes or cancellation.28
One alternative solution for users is to access a car owned by a commercial
company such as Zipcar or Car2Go instead of cars that are privately owned.
The problem with relying on a commercial provider is that rental companies
usually encourage a brand community and promote identification with particu-
lar cars.329 Access becomes less casual, and more prone to morph into steady
long-term business relations.33o Commercial companies award less flexibility.
Moreover, they retain the familiar business relationships with consumers, and
have significant power over users.
In contrast, peer-to-peer markets bring together individuals who lack any
real business experience or expertise. They are less sophisticated than commer-
cial suppliers of goods. To support this potential democratization, the law has
to provide overall protection to owners, in the form of special insurance pro-
grams and more elaborate consumer protection laws that protect not only the
owner, but also the user.
Another concern is that people who frequently rent out their possessions to
strangers may fall under a home business regulation.331 Some municipalities
prohibit home occupations in residential zones, others have a list of prohibited
occupations, and yet others distinguish between professionals and nonprofes-
sionals in granting permission to work from home.332 Additionally, the taxation
The personal vehicle sharing is conducted under a program; (2) The annual reve-
nue received by the vehicle's registered owner that was generated by the personal
vehicle sharing does not exceed the annual expenses of owning and operating the
vehicle. . . .
327. Id.
328. Ballis-Armet et al., supra note 323.
329. See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 159, at 886-88.
330. See generally RIFKIN, supra note 178 (criticizing the business model of lease, rent,
subscriptions, or memberships as a way to create ongoing relations between con-
sumers and businesses).
331. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and the Home-
Business Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1191, 1195 (2001) ("[Ilndividuals who
want to work at home face significant legal obstacles, especially municipal zoning
laws that severely restrict the operation of home businesses when they do not pro-
hibit them outright.").
332. Id. at 1207-08 ("Perhaps in an effort to reduce the uncertainty caused by these
vague restrictions, most municipalities have enacted zoning restrictions that more
specifically address home-based businesses. Some cities simply prohibit all home
occupations in residential zones. Zoning codes in jurisdictions that do not prohib-
it all home occupations often list permitted occupations, prohibited occupations,
or both. Many allow 'professionals' to ply their trade in residential areas, at least if
the home office is not their primary one.").
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of owners who rent out cars and everyday possessions can be tricky and cum-
bersome for nonprofessionals, particularly regarding cost deduction and appor-
tionment of expenses between business and personal uses.333 Filing taxes can be
simplified for sharing owners.
There are also calls for cities to encourage access instead of ownership by
improving users' experience.334 These initiatives suggest provisions for on-street
parking, exemptions from parking time limits, creation of car-sharing parking
zones, and more.335 However, parking benefits will presumably contribute to
customers of car-sharing businesses who are easily identified rather than peer-
to-peer car sharing. Another recommendation to cities is to "more closely align
taxes on carsharing with the general sales tax for other goods and services."336
Other options include city bike sharing that provides bikes to those who need
them on a casual short-term basis.337
This Section focuses on the normative importance of supporting access for
the benefit of individual users. Access has benefits and costs for cities as well.
Reduced traffic congestion and pollution, and encouraging healthier lifestyles
are possible benefits of bike sharing and car sharing.3 On the other hand, ac-
cess creates more activity in a given city that its infrastructure is not always able
to support. '9 Different cities have different needs, different infrastructures, and
organizational structures. This complexity explains the importance of contextu-
al regulations that are sensitive to each city's particular needs. Yet, current local
regulations in cities tend to marginalize the theoretical and normative aspects of
access. This Section therefore calls for state and local governments to seriously
consider the incentives of owners to rent out their assets. Instead of suggesting
concrete recommendations, it contributes an important consideration for regu-
lation that has escaped the discussion thus far.
333. See, e.g., Diane M. Ring & Shu-Yi Oei, Can Sharing be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV.
989 (2016) (discussing relevant tax laws that apply to various sharing economy
projects); Debbie Woscow, Unlocking the Sharing Economy: An Independent Re-
view, U.K. DEP'T Bus., INNOVATION & SKILL 9 (2014), http://www.gov
.uk/government/publications/unlocking-the-sharing-economy-independent
-review [http://perma.cc/S4VC-RZWJ] (recommending "a guide to tax in the
sharing economy, and an online tax calculator to help users of sharing economy
services to easily work out how much tax they are liable to pay").
334. See, e.g., Neal Gorenflo et al., Policies for Shareable Cities: A Sharing Economy Policy
Primer for Urban Leaders, SHAREABLE (Sept. 9, 2013), https://
www.nasco.coop/sites/default/files/srl/Policies%20for%2OShareable%20Cities.pdf
[http://perma.cc/FE55-64B4].
335. Id. at 9.
336. Id. at 11.
337. Id. at 13.
338. DeMaio, supra note 131.
339. Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an Urban Phe-





Discrimination in providing goods and services is generally prohibited by
public accommodation law. Places that are open to the public cannot discrimi-
nate against protected classes.3 4o State and federal public accommodation laws
stipulate the list of protected classes, the list of places and markets that count as
public accommodations, and the remedies available.34' There are, however, ex-
emptions and limitations,3" which include, among other things, an exemption
for places that are distinctively private.343
There is some level of ambiguity regarding the application of these laws to
people who rent out their car or personal belongings. Current exemptions make
a case that renting out private and personal possessions on occasion is not an
instance of public accommodation. This argument builds on the distinction be-
tween places that are personal and private, and places that are open to the pub-
lic. 344 People who share their personal possessions can be classified as private
and therefore remain unaffected by antidiscrimination laws. Moreover, a possi-
ble argument is that enforcing public accommodation laws will deter individu-
als from engaging in an economic and environmentally friendly activity.345
However, taking access seriously as an alternative form of property en-
gagement requires the application of antidiscrimination laws to these transac-
tions. As the goal of this project is to allow people to choose from among vari-
ous meaningful ways to use and enjoy property, the state should support a
constant flow of assets that can be fairly easily accessed. A recent study about
Airbnb practices found that users with African-American sounding names were
sixteen percent less likely to be accepted as guests than users with white sound-
ing names.3 ' 6 There are additional indications of discrimination in the sharing
340. See generally Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 34. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWs ch.
272, § 92A (2017) (barring discrimination in places of public accommodation).
341. Id.
342. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes an exemption for particular types
of hotels. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012); see also NEv. REV. STAT. § 651.060
(2017) (addressing inapplicability to private clubs and establishments).
343. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 2017) (explaining that "[n]othing here-
in contained shall be construed to include or to apply to any institution, bona fide
club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private").
344. Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 24, at 107.
345. For a discussion of public accommodations in small business, see Richard A. Ep-
stein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why Freedom of
Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (2014).
346. See Benjamin G. Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Ev-
idence from a Field Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1 (2017). Note that
this Article does not discuss personal property but rather Airbnb. However, be-
cause Airbnb is a prominent sharing enterprise, this example is illustrative.
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economy.7 If owners are allowed to discriminate, certain protected classes
might be de facto denied a viable, reasonable opportunity to access." They will,
in a way, be compelled to own property even if it is the less economically, envi-
ronmentally or socially suitable option for them.
However, applying antidiscrimination rules in peer-to-peer markets is a
complex task. In a previous article, I explored the possible tension between in-
timacy in the home and equality in sharing economy markets.4' The law has to
be attentive to the characteristics of the owner, the market, and the transaction.
Transactions in intimate property vary considerably. A nuanced approach
might consider the frequency of sharing transactions and the level of the inter-
action in devising new rules.
In addition, reducing discrimination in access-based transactions can po-
tentially be achieved through self-regulation. Airbnb recently commissioned a
report that reviews its current policies and suggests ways to address these prob-
lems.350 Recommendations include a community commitment declaration
signed by users, reducing the prominence of personal photos, and increasing
the option of instant booking.3 While this report represents an incredibly valu-
able step in the right direction, some of these recommendations obscure the in-
timate and personal character of these markets, a character that the parties have
come to expect. An alternative solution could be to develop other means of
building trusts among strangers that are less susceptible to racial biases.
3. Trespass and Possession
A necessary condition for ensuring enjoyment of property through access is
that short-term possession be protected from wrongful interference. If third
parties could intervene in an accessor's possession, then enjoyment of access
would be impossible. The requirement in this case fits perfectly with current
law. Indeed, the law protects possessors of property, real and personal, regard-
347. See generally Belzer & Leong, supra note 202; Tamar Kricheli Katz & Tali Regev,
How Many Cents on the Dollar? Women and Men in Product Markets 2 Sci. ADV. 1
(2016) (analyzing all eBay auction transaction of most popular products by private
sellers and finding that women sellers received fewer bids and lower final prices
than men for the same products).
348. Cf. Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 24.
349. Id.
350. Laura W. Murphy, Airbnb's Work to Fight Discrimination and Build Inclusion: A







less of title.352 According to the standard rule, a possessor can retain possession
against a wrongdoer who is a stranger to the property.353
4. Problems with Access: Protection Against Vulnerabilities
A shift from ownership to access may also create vulnerabilities and con-
cerns. Two of the concerns discussed in Section III.A.6 are of particular im-
portance. The first concerns the vulnerability to power, both the power of the
platform in controlling the conditions for the transaction and the available op-
portunities to access, and the power of users and owners.
Both owners and users are vulnerable in access transactions. Owners open
up their intimate environment,3 4 and are vulnerable to a violation of their pri-
vacy.35 In addition, property mistreatment is a significant concern. Because us-
ers do not own the property, they might use it less carefully. Who is responsible
for costs that occur from careless use?
Users are equally vulnerable to malfunctioning products and violations of
their privacy. An owner could potentially install a camera in the vehicle and
track the user's every move. Some of these concerns are mitigated by the inter-
nal mechanisms of the platforms, most importantly, reviews. However, the law
has to update its consumer protection laws. It has to consider the fact that both
owners and users should be considered consumers in these types of transac-
tions.
In addition, many forms of access are mediated by online platforms. Be-
cause these platforms are powerful, regulation is required to secure the privacy
interests of users.35' A truly casual, flexible use of property requires resistance to
surveillance. Platforms also hold considerable power and are able to impede the
access of certain users at will. This is a call for regulating platforms.5 7 Although
352. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 100 (7th ed. 2010).
353. See, e.g., Anderson v. Gouldberg, 53 N.W. 636 (Minn. 1892); Payne v. TK Auto
Wholesalers, 911 A.2d 747 (Conn. App. 2006). But see Richard H. Helmholz,
Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 Nw. U. L. REV.
1221 (1985) (arguing that courts regularly prefer an honest subsequent possessor
to a prior wrongful one). However, Helmholz discusses wrongdoers and accessor
use of property with the permission of the owner.
354. Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and the Sharing Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1023, 1026-27 (2016).
355. See, e.g., Policy Allows Guests to Snoop Your Private Stuff and Write About What
They Find, AIRBNB HELL (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.airbnbhell.com/policy
-allows-guests-to-snoop-your-private-stuff-and-write-about-what-they-find
[http://perma.cc/LCY6-YF72].
356. Cf Michael Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, Does Law Matter Online? Empirical Evi-
dence on Privacy Law Compliance, 7 MICH. TELE. & TECH. L. REv. 337 (2011) (find-
ing that only a minority of websites comply with informational privacy require-
ments).
357. See sources cited supra note 296.
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there have been calls for allowing self-regulation, 3  a certain level of legal over-
sight is necessary considering the sheer power of platforms to regulate, shape,
and constitute the possibilities available to users. Equal access to the platform,
access without surveillance, and certain responsibility for damages are key ex-
amples of the protection of users.
An additional concern is the loss of stability. Access supports flexibility and
mobility, but as Section III.A.6 explains, accessors are vulnerable to sudden
changes in their lives. The law could instead develop new safeguards to ensure
stability that is not based on property ownership, but rather on state support.
5. Share, Own, Access
The new property regime raises two important issues. The first issue con-
cerns the institutional design of access. Property can be accessed in peer-to-peer
markets,3 59 in the community (share)360 from a state-owned resource 36 or from
commercial companies such as Zipcar.36 ' All these institutions have both bene-
fits and costs. A thorough institutional analysis exceeds the scope of this Article.
Nonetheless, this Article focuses primarily on peer-to-peer markets as the best
example of access because they maximize the normative advantages of access.
Peer-to-peer markets allow for flexibility and choice because they offer a pleth-
ora of available options without promoting brand association or consumer loy-
alty to a specific company.
The second issue concerns the proportion of share, own, and access. Share
balances the commodifying concern of access because it works within the
community. The proportion of access and ownership is a more complex issue.
This Article supports a pluralistic approach that facilitates and supports users'
choices. However, the balance of access and ownership has wider implications.
There are two possible extreme outcomes. One is that ownership will become
more lucrative and consumers will have strong incentives to own and then rent
out their personal property. Individuals with more property to rent out will
function as a hybrid between commercial companies and peer-to-peer markets.
An opposite possible outcome is that access will become so popular, signifi-
cantly decreasing ownership and leaving accessors again with no reliable flow of
assets to access. This possibility raises serious concerns because individuals will
358. Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 312.
359. See Ghose et al., supra note 126.
360. See infra Section III.C.
361. One example is a local government owned bike-sharing program. See, e.g., DeMa-
io, supra note 131, at 45 ("In the government model, the locality operates the bike-
sharing service as it would any other transit service. The government of Burgos,
Spain, purchased and operates an off-the-shelf bike-sharing system called Bicibur.
With this model, the government as operator has greater control over the pro-
gram. On the other hand, it may not have the experience that existing bike-sharing
operators have in managing a program." (internal citation omitted)).




no longer own property. Property will be owned presumably by commercial
companies or by the state. If one recognizes the value associated with ownership
for civic independence, freedom, and autonomy, then private ownership has to
remain a viable option. This does not mean, however, that ownership should
remain as privileged as it is today.
In addition, access has to be widespread enough so as not to be considered
the second-best choice, catering mostly to the poorer population. The values of
flexibility, mobility, and experimentation demand that it remains a valuable op-
tion.
The balance between access and ownership requires two significant options
that are both legally supported and socially valuable. Regulatory support of ac-
cess combined with a certain protection of ownership will allow people to
choose between these property engagements.
C. Share: Casual Property and Strong Community
An additional form of using, enjoying, and engaging with property is share.
Share also carries important normative and relational benefits, as well as unique
structural characteristics. First, the choice of share emphasizes the usability and
functionality of an asset, rather than the control and exclusion that are associat-
ed with ownership.6 3 Second, objects are repeatedly exchanged and this
changeover is the foundation for strong communal ties.36 4 Third, share is a
manifestation of freedom from corporate power365 and reflects an environmen-
tal, social agenda.366 Finally, share allows for the efficient use of certain types of
assets, toys, tools and special garments that are more rarely used and systemati-
cally underutilized when privately owned.367
The option to share as a form of casual access and communal participation
can be generally classified as a special case of the commons.368 Yet, unlike forms
of coownership where each owner values the property itself,369 in the case of
share, the property is often casually used; the exchange with the community and
usability of the object take precedence. These unique characteristics require a
fresh and nuanced legal treatment. Legal rules should not only support the op-
tion of share, but also provide a better-suited legal framework for the relations
363. See supra Section II.B.2 and supra notes 178-189 and accompanying text.
364. See supra Section II.B.2.
365. See supra notes 235-244 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 250-251.
367. See Benkler, supra note 124.
368. See supra Section I.B.3.
369. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 95 (discussing co-ownership as the liberal com-
mons); Anna di Robilant, Common Ownership and Equality of Autonomy, 58
McGILL L.J. 263 (2012) (arguing that co-ownership can achieve equality of auton-
omy); Sarah E. Waldeck, Rethinking the Intersection of Inheritance and the Law of
Tenancy in Common, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 737 (2013).
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between a member, an object, and other members participating in a share activ-
ity. Put differently, there are two arguments at play here. First, the state should
recognize and support share as a valid alternative to ownership. As explained
above, when individuals have a choice to engage with property in different
ways, a decision to own a certain object, access another object, and share yet
another validates ownership as well. It allows for a more nuanced selection of
property engagement. Instead of favoring certain forms, the law needs to offer a
menu of possibilities. These possibilities not only add options, but also provide
a critical alternative that marks a new vision for property; a vision of flexibility
and experimentation instead of stability and permanence. Second, share as a
unique hybrid merits a specific set of legal rules that deal with responsibility and
liability regarding loss, theft, or damages to the asset shared. These rules should
be different from ownership and from the law of coownership.
1. Removing Legal Barriers
There are not many legal barriers to book, tool, clothes or toy libraries.370
Regulation, taxation, insurance, and zoning could be crafted so as to encourage
these projects. For example, certain Free Little Lending libraries often do not
comply with local ordinances.371 The Free Little Lending library movement has
spread across America. Book lovers put a crate of books in their front yard for
neighbors to borrow, read, and add books.Y There have been several cases, re-
ported in the media, where these libraries have been shut down because they
appear to be an illegal detached structure.37 Without disputing the need for
370. Most guides to setting up a toy library do not address legal obstacles. See, e.g., Step
by Step Guide to Starting a Toy Lending Library: Creating Diverse, Low-Impact Play-
time Opportunities for Kids, CTR. FOR NEW AM. DREAM (Feb. 2016),
http://newdream.s3.amazonaws.com/19/24/9/4252/Step-by-StepStarting-aToy
_LendingLibrary.pdf [http://perma.cc/4RDC-LHL9]; Cat Johnson, How to Start a
Toy Library: 12 Quick Tips, SHAREABLE (March 29, 2016)
http://www.shareable.net/blog/how-to-start-a-toy-library-12-quick-tips [http://
perma.cc/9ASR-6KHG] (addressing only the legal structure). Some libraries are
registered as charity entities or nonprofit organizations. See, e.g., About Us,
KARORI TOY LIBRARY, http://www.karoritoylibrary.org.nz/about-us [http:// per-
ma.cc/HD4N-PMUH]; STEPS CHARITY, http://www.facebook.com/Stepscharity
[http://perma.cc/5WKM-D8Z7].
371. Conor Friedersdorf, The Danger of Being Neighborly Without a Permit, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archivel
2015/02/little-free-library-crackdown/385531/ [http://perma.cc/VW36-NKTZ].
372. Id.
373. Id.; see also Xeni Jardin, Boy, 9, Creates Library in His Front Yard. City, Stupid,
Shuts It Down, BOINGBOING (June 19, 2014, 3:49 PM),
http://boingboing.net/2014/06/19/boy-9-creates-library-in-his.html [http://perma
.cc/8Q29-X23X]; Steve Lopez, Actor's Curbside Library Is a Smash for Most People,





zoning regulation, local government should be careful not to burden this spon-
taneous community sharing, which is vulnerable.
2. Loss, Damage, and Theft of Property
The physical integrity of property is protected in both tort and property
law. Wrongdoers are liable for negligent use of personal property, resulting in
its loss, destruction, or damage.37 4 When a borrower negligently uses the lend-
er's property, she might have to pay damages.375 In addition to these general
rules of law, many lenders and borrowers have a specific contract, or require a
deposit to ensure reasonable use.376 These rules and agreements are founded on
the premise that the owner extracts value from the property.377 Because owner-
ship manifests the legal deference to an owner's right to her property,378 any
misuse of a person's property should be properly compensated.
The unique characteristics of community lending libraries should be re-
flected in the legal rules in the case of loss, damage, or conversion of the bor-
rowed item. For each member, the object itself is replaceable and meant for
short-term use.79 However, it is equally meant to serve subsequent users in the
sharing project.30 Loss, damage, or failure to return an item often reflect care-
lessness and indifference, a lack of commitment to the sharing project. It weak-
ens the group's ability to promote share as a form of engaging with property.
For this reason, it is important to distinguish between two categories of cases:
cases that reflect lack of respect for and indifference to the sharing project, and
cases that result from the natural, common, usual use of items.
Consider, first, the loss of property. Typically, when a borrower loses an
object owned by the lender, she has to compensate the owner or lose her depos-
it.3sx In a sharing project, the loss of casual, moderately priced objects should be
excused for the first certain number of times. Because a member of the lending
374. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 308 (2017); cf. Parratt et al. v. Taylor 451 U.S. 527
(1981). See also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 120-30, 257 (2001).
375. See generally Christian Witting, Physical Damage in Negligence, 61 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
189 (2002) (discussing physical damages to property).
376. See, e.g., DEBORAH HUTCHISTON & LYNN TOLER, PUT IT IN WRITING!: CREATING
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FAMILY AND FRIENDS 39-41 (2009) (stressing the im-
portance of making lending agreements); see also Rent/Lend Agreements, SHAKE
(2017), http://www.shakelaw.com/legal-info/rentlend-agreements/ [http://perma
.cc/N45E-RX2JJ.
377. On ownership and value, see Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 72.
378. Dorfman, supra note 45; Katz, supra note 45.
379. See supra Section II.B.2.
380. Cf supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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library participates in the project and contributes to it, and considering that los-
ing items here and there is very common,382 no damage should be paid in these
cases. But a member that repeatedly loses items expresses carelessness towards
the sharing project and communal enjoyment and therefore undermines the
foundations of this form of engagement. This case requires paying a fine. How-
ever, this distinction between occasional and repeated loss is not the current
policy in certain lending libraries.8 3
Another example concerns the failure to return items, which may consti-
tute conversion or even theft.384 Unless the item has been lost or misplaced,
failure to return should lead to similar results as in the case of ownership. The
justification, however, is different. In the case of community lending libraries, it
is not to protect ownership from wrongful interference,38 5 but in order to deter
any indifference to the sharing project that is reflected by a failure to return
items.
Finally, any damage to personal property that results from negligent use is
subject to liability in tort.386 The object has to be reasonably used. This is also
true in the case of community lending libraries. However, the standard of rea-
sonable use should be different.38 1 Libraries should allow people to experiment
more with the item and use it as their own, compared with more traditional
one-time borrowers.
These rules should be set as default rules. 388 Instead of traditional tort or li-
ability rules, the law should employ rules that are designed specifically for shar-
382. See DUKEMINIER, supra note 352, at 97-108 (discussing acquisition of property by
finding).
383. See, e.g., Borrowing, Box HILL AREA TOY LIBRARY, http://boxhillareatoylibrary
.org.au/toys/borrowing/ [http://perma.cc/6SYA-CHX5] (charging a fine for bro-
ken or missing toys); Borrowing, KARORI TOY LIBRARY, http://www
.karoritoylibrary.org.nzlborrowing [http://perma.cc/SQ96-5N8S] (collecting a $5
fine for all missing, lost, or destroyed pieces).
384. DOBBS, supra note 374, at 120-36.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 257.
387. Cf R.H. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive Uni-
form Standard of Reasonable Care, 41 U. KAN. L. REv. 97 (1992) (discussing the
standard of reasonable care).
388. Generally, default rules are meant to save transaction costs for the parties to a con-
tract. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 301-04
(2004). However, default rules also have an expressive function. See Cass R. Sun-
stein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996); Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLuM. L. REV. 903 (1996). See general-
ly Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503 (2000) (offering a philosophical account of
default rules). Default rules have considerable effects on behavior. See Russell
Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608




ing enterprises. Libraries will be able to opt out of these rules, allowing each
community to choose the rules most appropriate to the type of assets, the na-
ture of use, and the level of group cohesion. The purpose of these new defaults
is to provide a point of reference for new projects that is sensitive to the unique
features of share.389 The rules offer a.framework for practicing, understanding
and theorizing share.
3. Participation
In order for a lending library to be understood as a form of share, there
must be some level of member involvement. For the sharing project to consti-
tute an alternative form of property engagement, its members must be involved
in advancing it and committed to subsequent borrowers. Involvement can in-
clude volunteering in day-to-day management, engaging in social events, and
participating in decision-making processes.390 Without member participation,
lending libraries are no more than a form of collective consumerism.
Participation is an important part of the definition of share as a form of
communal access. If the state decides to encourage share, provide tax benefits,
and remove barriers, participation should be required as a prerequisite for ben-
efits. In addition, participation is also a guiding principle for establishing the
internal rules of new projects.
4. Antidiscrimination Law
Share, much like access, requires the application of antidiscrimination
law.391 If community lending libraries were to be considered a private club for
the purpose of public accommodation law, then the option of share would be
normatively at risk.392 In order for individuals to truly be able to choose share,
chological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1583 (1998);
see also Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supple-
mentation, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 801 (1997); cf. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains:
The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1815, 1867-68
(1991).
389. Cf DAGAN, supra note 70 (property as the default framework of interpersonal in-
teraction); Dagan, supra note 44.
390. Member, Box HILL AREA TOY LIBRARY, http://boxhillareatoylibrary.org.au/
join/member/ [http://perma.cc/D3SR-JDDN] (requiring members either to
"[v]olunteer at 4 'duty' sessions a year (1 hour per session)" or to "[h]elp out at an
annual stocktake or fundraising (2-3 hours)" in addition to paying an annual
membership fee); Member Responsibilities, KARORI TOY LIBRARY,
http://www.karoritoylibrary.org.nz/belonging [http://perma.cc/Z8MG-WW6K]
(necessitating members to perform duties including assisting the librarian with is-
sues and returns, helping new members, and processing any new toys).
391. Supra note 330 and accompanying text.
392. On the private club exemption, see Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude:
Public Accommodation and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1283, 1420 (1995).
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engage in communal projects and exchange casual use of items, libraries cannot
discriminate. If libraries are allowed to discriminate, certain protected classes
might be de facto denied a real opportunity to share.393 As explained above, they
will be pushed towards property ownership even in assets they prefer to share.
CONCLUSION
Property law, supported by prominent works of legal theory, focuses pri-
marily on ownership and long-term possession.394 For years, this model has
been the focal point of major scholarship in the field.
395 With the rise of legal
realism, however, some developments have occurred.396 More forms of property
were introduced, sponsored by the property-as-a-bundle-of-rights approach.
397
Nonetheless, this array of rights still consists mostly of in rem rights or pertains
to some form of continuing use.398
This Article presents an alternative vision of property. This legal departure
supports two main arguments. First, this Article has argued that the law directs
individuals to choose ownership over other alternatives, even when such a
choice is less efficient and desirable. Access and share are far inferior options
under the current legal reality. The second argument is theoretical. Access and
share promote property-associated values. Moreover, the ability to choose ac-
cess and share also makes the choice of ownership more meaningful, and at the
end of the day, validates it as well. This Article returns to the well-known max-
im of property as the. law of things,399 not to glorify ownership, but in order to
compare, discuss, and acknowledge other alternatives to property that have very
different features and normative value.
To conclude, this Article is part of a larger project that is examining the
ways in which the sharing economy and consumption patterns demand a re-
thinking of established property law conceptions, rules, and doctrines.
393. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
394. See supra Section I.A.
395. Id.
396. See supra Section I.A.4.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. See generally Grey, supra note 232; Smith, supra note 78; Penner, supra note 41.
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